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Where Is Home Depot “At Home”?:
Daimler v. Bauman and the End of Doing
Business Jurisdiction
Tanya J. Monestier*
In January 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Daimler AG v. Bauman. The case
was supposed to resolve a very important question that had divided courts for decades:
when, for jurisdictional purposes, can the contacts of a subsidiary be imputed to its
parent? The Supreme Court dodged this question. Instead, it answered a different, but
equally important, question: under what circumstances is a corporation “at home” such
that a state has general jurisdiction over it? The Court had introduced the “at home”
language to the discourse on general jurisdiction a few years earlier in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, when it held that a state has general
jurisdiction over a corporation if its activities within the state are so continuous and
systematic as to render the corporation essentially “at home” there. At the time, courts
and commentators were not one-hundred percent clear on the meaning of the “at
home” language. After Daimler, they will be.
Daimler reinforced the idea that the “at home” basis for general jurisdiction is intended
to be exceptional. Ordinarily, a corporation is only “at home”—and therefore subject to
general jurisdiction—in, at most, two places: its state of incorporation and its principal

place of business. In making this pronouncement, the Supreme Court has done away
with a very well established, albeit wholly under-theorized, basis for general
jurisdiction: “doing business.” For the better part of a century, courts had assumed
general jurisdiction over corporations on the basis that they were doing business in the
forum, as evidenced by the corporation’s commercial presence in the state. This basis of
jurisdiction was perceived as exorbitant by foreigners and often condemned as
promoting forum shopping. Daimler officially sounds the death knell for doing business
jurisdiction in the United States.
In this Article, I examine the decisions of the majority and the concurrence,
highlighting the critical areas of disagreement. I lay out the key implications of Daimler:

* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. I would like to thank Nicole
Manzo for her invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this Article. Thank you as well to
Professor Colleen Murphy, who provided very helpful comments on a previous draft of this Article.
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the end of doing business jurisdiction in the United States, the doctrinal pressure on
alternative bases of jurisdiction to fill the void left by Daimler, and the real-world
consequences for litigants and courts. I also look at the critical questions that Daimler
left unanswered—in particular, the standard for imputation of jurisdictional contacts
from a subsidiary to a parent and the propriety of imputation where the underlying
basis of jurisdiction is that the subsidiary is incorporated in the state or has its principal
place of business there. The implications of the Daimler decision will be felt by both
plaintiffs and defendants for years to come. Accordingly, it warrants a careful look.
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Introduction
A shopper in Tallahassee, Florida slips and falls at The Home
Depot (“Home Depot”), suffering various personal injuries. She later
moves to Dallas, Texas, and ultimately decides to sue Home Depot in
Texas with respect to the Florida slip-and-fall. Until earlier this year, a
court probably would have concluded that Texas had jurisdiction over
Home Depot because Home Depot was doing business in Texas. After
all, Home Depot has a total of 178 physical stores in Texas, not to
mention thousands of employees.1 After the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daimler AG v. Bauman,2 however, a Texas court would likely conclude
the opposite: Texas does not have jurisdiction over Home Depot with
respect to a slip-and-fall accident that occurred in Florida. The Court in
Daimler made it very clear that a court can only exercise general
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant in three places: (1) in its state of
incorporation; (2) in the state where it has its principal place of business;
1. The Home Depot, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Mar. 27, 2014).
2. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
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and (3) in exceptional cases, anywhere else where the corporation has
continuous and systematic general business contacts and can fairly be
regarded to be “at home.”3 The Court emphasized repeatedly that the
third basis for general jurisdiction would be used only on rare occasions
and that large multinational corporations could not be regarded “at
home” anywhere and everywhere they conducted a large volume of
business.4
After Daimler, the question, “Where is Home Depot ‘at Home’?”
invites a simple response. Home Depot is “at home” in Delaware (its
state of incorporation) and in Georgia (the state of its principal place of
business).5 These are likely the only two states that can assert general
jurisdiction over Home Depot.6 This marks a radical departure from
decades of case law holding that general jurisdiction was appropriate
where a company was doing business in the forum—in the sense of
having continuous and systematic general business contacts with the
forum.7 Accordingly, Daimler marks the official end of doing business
jurisdiction in the United States.
This Article will examine in detail the Daimler decision and its
implications for future cases. In Part I, I provide a brief introduction to
general jurisdiction, tracing the history of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the continuous and systematic test for general
jurisdiction over corporations. In Part II, I outline the Daimler case,
discussing both the majority and concurring decisions.8 I sketch out in
3. Id. at 760–61, 761 n.19.
4. Id. at 760–62, 762 n.20 (“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at
home in all of them.”); accord Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No.11-965),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-965_l647.pdf (according
to Justice Kagan, if Daimler “were subject to general jurisdiction in California, so, too, it would be subject
to general jurisdiction in every State in the United States, and all of that has got to be wrong”).
5. See Fuller v. Home Depot Servs., LLC, No. 1:107-CV-1268-RLV, 2007 WL 2345257, at *3
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2007).
6. This leaves aside registering to do business as an independent basis for general jurisdiction.
See infra Part IV.B.
7. The departure started in 2011 when the Supreme Court added the “at home” qualifier to the
test for general jurisdiction over corporations in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
8. For an analysis of the Daimler case prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, see generally Donald
Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market, 66 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 67
(2013) [hereinafter Childress, Transnational Law Market]; Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State Test
for General Personal Jurisdiction, 66 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 81 (2013); Lonny Hoffman, Further
Thinking About Vicarious Jurisdiction: Reflecting on Goodyear v. Brown and Looking Ahead to
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 34 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 765 (2013); Suzanna Sherry, Don’t Answer That! Why (and
How) the Supreme Court Should Duck the Issue in DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 66 Vand. L. Rev. En
Banc 111 (2013); Linda J. Silberman, Jurisdictional Imputation in DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman: A
Bridge Too Far, 66 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 123 (2013); Verity Winship, Personal Jurisdiction and
Corporate Groups: DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 9 J. Private Int’l L. 431 (2013). For an analysis of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler, see generally Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction
After Bauman, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 197 (2014) [hereinafter Childress, After Bauman]; Judy M. Cornett &

Monestier_21 (Teixeira CORRECTED).DOC (Do Not Delete)

December 2014]

WHERE IS HOME DEPOT “AT HOME”?

11/26/2014 2:22 PM

237

Part III the key areas of disagreement between the majority and the
concurrence: the nature of the test for general jurisdiction, the meaning
of the words “at home,” and the propriety of a reasonableness test for
general jurisdiction. In Part IV, I explore the implications of the Daimler
decision on a broader level. I conclude that Daimler marks the official
end of doing business jurisdiction in the United States; the consequence
of this is that there will be additional pressure on alternative bases of
jurisdiction to fill the void left by Daimler. I also discuss some practical
ramifications of Daimler for litigants and courts. In Part V, I look at
some unanswered questions in the wake of Daimler. Most glaringly, the
Court in Daimler did not answer the question for which it had ostensibly
granted certiorari—when can the jurisdictional contacts of a subsidiary
be imputed to a parent? A related question presented by the Court’s
decision in Daimler concerns jurisdictional imputation when the
underlying basis of jurisdiction is that the subsidiary is incorporated in
the forum or has its principal place of business there. Finally, in Part VI,
I offer some concluding remarks.

I. An Introduction to General Jurisdiction
American law has, for the most part, adhered to a two-part
conceptual structure in analyzing personal jurisdiction, dividing the
analysis between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. Specific
jurisdiction is premised on the relationship between the defendant, the
forum, and the underlying cause of action.9 It is said that where the cause
of action is “related to or arising from” the defendant’s in-state activities,
the state has specific jurisdiction over the defendant.10 For instance, if a
manufacturer sells a defective product in State X and a resident is injured
by the product in State X, it is likely that State X will have specific
jurisdiction over the defendant. General jurisdiction, on the other hand,
is premised on the relationship between the defendant and the forum.11
Notably, courts asserting general jurisdiction over a defendant can do so
in the absence of any connection between the state and the underlying
cause of action.12 Rather, the connection between the defendant and the

Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction after Daimler AG
v. Bauman, Ohio St. L.J. (forthcoming 2014); Stanley E. Cox, The Missing ‘Why’ of General Jurisdiction,
U. Pitt. L. Rev. (forthcoming); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to
Personal Jurisdiction, SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (forthcoming
2014); Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
9. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
10. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
11. See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 721, 735 (1988).
12. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
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state is considered so significant that the connection, in itself, is regarded
as infusing the state with jurisdictional power over the defendant.13
There are two well-established bases of general jurisdiction over
corporations: a corporation can always be sued on any cause of action,
first, in its state of incorporation and second, in the state of its principal
place of business.14 In both of these scenarios, the state is regarded as
possessing general jurisdiction over the corporation because of the
unique relationship between the state and the corporation.15 General
jurisdiction is an extremely powerful form of jurisdiction, since it can
result in a court adjudicating a controversy with absolutely no connection
to the state. Consider the following example: ABC Corp. is a
manufacturer of running shoes that is incorporated in the state of
Delaware. It operates a Mexican plant where it employs Mexican
workers pursuant to a contract executed in Mexico and governed by
Mexican law. If an employment dispute arises between the Mexican
workers and ABC Corp., Delaware courts will have authority to hear the
dispute. Since ABC Corp. is incorporated in Delaware, the courts of
Delaware have the ability to adjudicate any and all disputes concerning
ABC Corp., regardless of where the dispute arose.
Although the labels of “specific jurisdiction” and “general
jurisdiction” are often attributed to an influential article written by
Professors von Mehren and Trautman,16 the seeds of this jurisdictional
13. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 84 (“General jurisdiction is justified by the relationship
between a state and those who make the state their home.”).
14. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 728.
15. In A General Look at General Jurisdiction, Professors Brilmayer, Haverkamp, and Logan
describe why general jurisdiction over a corporation based on its state of incorporation is appropriate:
First, the corporation intentionally chooses to create a relationship with the state of
incorporation, presumably to obtain the benefits of that state’s substantive and procedural
laws. Such a choice creates a unique relationship that justifies general jurisdiction over the
corporation. Second, the corporation, unlike an individual, cannot ever be absent from the
state of incorporation. Third, even if a corporation neither does business nor maintains an
office in the incorporating state, the incorporation process itself provides notice of the
potential for judicial jurisdiction. Finally, the corporation is likely to be familiar with that
state’s law, arguably more familiar than an individual domiciliary would be, because the
corporation presumably based its incorporation decision in part on the state’s substantive law.
Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 733–34. The authors point out that these rationales also apply,
perhaps with slightly less force, to the state of the corporation’s principal place of business. Id. Accord
Erichson, supra note 8, at 86–87.
16. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966) (“In American thinking, affiliations between the forum
and the underlying controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate. This
we call specific jurisdiction. On the other hand, American practice for the most part is to exercise
power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or
indirect, between the forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected. This we
call general jurisdiction.”). Note that some authors have questioned the utility of this bipartite
framework. See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 Wake Forest L.
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framework can be found in International Shoe Co. v. Washington itself.17
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court noted that jurisdiction over a
corporation could be appropriate where the corporation engaged in
activities in the forum that were “so substantial and of such a nature” as
to justify suit in an action wholly unrelated to a corporation’s in-state
activities.18 Although on its facts, International Shoe was a specific
jurisdiction case, it nonetheless telegraphed the structure of personal
jurisdiction analysis that would guide courts for years to come.
Prior to 2011, the Supreme Court had decided only two cases
dealing with general jurisdiction. The first, Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., involved a Philippine mining corporation sued
in Ohio over a cause of action that was not related to the corporation’s
activities in Ohio.19 The plaintiff sought to establish that Ohio had
general jurisdiction over the Philippine company, even though the
company was not incorporated in Ohio and did not have its principal
place of business there.20 Nevertheless, the Court found that the
defendant was subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio.21 The Court
observed that the defendant had ceased its mining activities in the
Philippines, and to the extent that it was carrying on any business, it was
doing so in Ohio.22 After examining the activities undertaken in Ohio by
the president of the corporation, the Court stated, “he carried on in Ohio
a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited
wartime activities of the company.”23 Accordingly, the Court found that
it would not offend due process to assert personal jurisdiction over the
defendant corporation.24
The next Supreme Court pronouncement on general jurisdiction
came three decades later in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall.25 In Helicopteros, the plaintiffs sued a Colombian corporation in
Texas with respect to a helicopter accident that took place in Peru.26 The
plaintiffs maintained that the defendant had sufficient contacts with
Rev. 999, 1075 (2012) (“Finally, some courts and commentators have suggested that jurisdiction is
proper in cases that fall between the definitions or categories of specific and general jurisdiction. They
object to strict characterization of a case as falling in one category or the other. They suggest either a
‘sliding scale’ or ‘hybrid’ approach. Professor Richman proposes a sliding scale theory, and Professor
Simard a hybrid form of jurisdiction. The theories vary slightly, but both would find proper jurisdiction
in fact patterns that are ‘near misses’ on both the relatedness and extent of contacts factors.”).
17. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
18. Id. at 318.
19. 342 U.S. 437, 438–39 (1952).
20. Id. at 447–48.
21. Id. at 448.
22. Id. at 447–48.
23. Id. at 448.
24. Id.
25. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
26. Id. at 409–10.

Monestier_21 (Teixeira CORRECTED).DOC (Do Not Delete)

240

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

11/26/2014 2:22 PM

[Vol. 66:233

Texas to support the exercise of general jurisdiction: the defendant
purchased helicopters and other equipment in Texas; the defendant sent
pilots and management personnel into Texas to be trained and to consult
on technical matters; the defendant negotiated the contract under which
it provided transportation services to the joint venture that employed the
decedents in Texas; and the defendant accepted checks drawn on a Texas
bank into its New York bank account.27 Unlike Perkins, the majority of
the Supreme Court in Helicopteros found that these contacts did not
constitute continuous and systematic general business contacts sufficient
to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant.28 For
instance, the Court noted that “one trip to Houston by Helicol’s chief
executive officer for the purpose of negotiating the . . . contract . . .
cannot be described or regarded as a contact of a ‘continuous and
systematic’ nature.”29 Similarly, the defendant’s acceptance of checks
drawn on a Texas bank was of “negligible significance” in determining
whether the defendant had sufficient contacts in Texas to ground general
jurisdiction.30
The “continuous and systematic general business contacts” language
from Helicopteros thereafter became the operative test for general
jurisdiction over corporations.31 Courts would ask whether a corporation
had sufficiently continuous and systematic general business contacts with
a state so as to justify the assertion of general jurisdiction over a
corporation. States developed their own factors to consider in evaluating
whether a corporation’s contacts rose to the level of being continuous
and systematic. Generally speaking, courts would look at factors that
were thought to approximate the corporation’s physical presence in the
state, such as the number of employees in the state, the volume of sales
and/or purchases in the state, the corporation’s registration to do
business in a state, and so on.32
The concept of continuous and systematic general business contacts
eventually morphed with the notion of “doing business.”33 That is, if a
27. Id. at 410–11, 416.
28. Id. at 416–19.
29. Id. at 416.
30. Id.
31. In addition to, of course, state of incorporation and principal place of business.
32. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is ‘fairly high,’ and requires that the defendant’s
contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence. Factors to be taken into consideration are
whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the state’s markets,
designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there.” (citations omitted)
(quoting Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986)).
33. See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing Business Jurisdiction, 2001
U. Chi. Legal F. 171, 172–73 (“Courts seem to have articulated a fairly straightforward standard for
doing-business jurisdiction: states have general jurisdiction over corporations doing continuous and
systematic business in the forum.”); Paul R. Dubinksy, The Reach of Doing Business Jurisdiction and
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corporation was doing business in a forum with a degree of permanence
and regularity, then it had continuous and systematic general business
contacts with the forum and would be subject to general jurisdiction
there. Thus, doing business essentially became synonymous with, or a
proxy for, the Helicopteros standard of continuous and systematic
general business contacts.34 There were few guideposts for courts
deciding whether a corporation was doing business such that it would be
subject to general jurisdiction.35 Accordingly, courts were largely left to
their own devices in determining when a corporation would or would not
be subject to general jurisdiction.36 This arguably resulted, at least in
some cases, in exorbitant assertions of jurisdiction over corporations
doing business in a state.37
One such case is the Ninth Circuit’s 2003 decision in Gator.com
Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc.38 There, a California-based software company,
Gator.com, sued Maine clothing manufacturer L.L. Bean in federal court
in California seeking a declaratory judgment that its pop-up Internet

Transacting Business Jurisdiction Over Non-U.S. Individuals and Entities, U.S. Dep’t of State,
http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/global/legal_affairs/dubinsky.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2014) (“It is
difficult to summarize with precision the types and quantities of business activities within a state of the
United States that will support a conclusion that the defendant is ‘doing business’ there and will be
required to defend a lawsuit unrelated to its activities in that state. The phrase most frequently
repeated by the Supreme Court is ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ within the
jurisdiction.”).
34. See Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 671, 675 (2012) (“[L]ower courts [have] widely embraced the notion that
any corporation ‘doing business’ in a state [is] subject to general jurisdiction there.”). In addition,
many states have directly codified “doing business” jurisdiction in their individual long-arm statutes.
See, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-209(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2009); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 600.711(3) (West 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301(a)(2)(iii) (West 2004); Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042 (West 2008). Note that this is different than “transacting business,” which is
commonly associated with specific jurisdiction. See Roger W. Kirby, Access to United States Courts
by Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securities in the Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd., 7 Hastings Bus. L.J. 223, 247 n.128 (2011) (“Essentially, doing business refers to a continuous
and systematic business activity in the forum, which would subject defendant to a claim for any cause.
Transacting business concerns ‘an isolated but purposeful business transaction in [the forum] and the
plaintiff’s claim arises out of the particular transaction.’” (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 302 (McKinney 2008)).
35. See Feder, supra note 34, at 674–76 (“The Supreme Court has never articulated any
underlying theory of general jurisdiction or even attempted to explain in a particular case why the
contacts at issue were, or were not, sufficient to justify a state’s assertion of authority over a
defendant’s out of state activities.”).
36. See id. at 675.
37. See James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of
General Jurisdiction, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 969, 984–85 (2012) (observing that “a number of lower
courts have not required truly substantial contacts to warrant general personal jurisdiction”); Sherry,
supra note 8, at 117 (noting that some courts “had loosened the definition of continuous and
systematic contacts so far that any company with substantial sales in a state was subject to general
jurisdiction in that state”).
38. 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003).
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software did not infringe upon the defendant’s trademark rights or
otherwise violate state or federal law.39 The case turned on the question
of whether the California court had general jurisdiction over the
defendant, L.L. Bean.40 The court noted that L.L. Bean was a Maine
corporation with its principal place of business in that state.41 It
maintained physical stores in Maine, Delaware, New Hampshire,
Oregon, and Virginia.42 In addition, it sold over one billion dollars in
merchandise annually to consumers in 150 different countries.43 The
court indicated that a large percentage of L.L. Bean’s sales came from its
mail-order and Internet businesses, with approximately sixteen percent
of its sales in 2000 deriving from the latter.44 After noting that the
standard for general jurisdiction is “fairly high”45 and that the case
presented a “close question,”46 the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded
that California did have general jurisdiction over L.L. Bean.47 The court
stated that the defendant’s overall commercial contacts with California,
primarily through its website, met the continuous and systematic test
articulated in Helicopteros.48 The court held that there was nothing
unfair about requiring the defendant to be subject to the authority of the
California court where it “has deliberately and purposely availed itself,
on a very large scale, of the benefits of doing business within the state.”49
Commentators questioned the propriety of this decision, pointing
out the jurisdictional ramifications of the court’s ruling.50 If L.L. Bean
could be held to be doing business (in the jurisdictional sense) in
California, then it could easily be held to be doing business in all fifty
states. Would this mean that L.L. Bean was subject to general
jurisdiction in every state? By extension, would this mean that all large
companies with a substantial presence in all fifty states—either physical
or virtual—would be subject to general jurisdiction everywhere in the
United States?51

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1074.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1076 (quoting Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Id. at 1078.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1079.
See generally James R. Pielemeier, Why General Personal Jurisdiction over “Virtual Stores”
is a Bad Idea, 27 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 625 (2009).
51. See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1066–67 (“Take as an example a corporation such as
McDonald’s. Before Goodyear was decided, Professor Glannon argued that, because the corporation
has a very strong physical presence in most states, through its numerous employees and restaurants,
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In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, using it as an opportunity to clarify the scope
of general jurisdiction.52 In Goodyear, North Carolina plaintiffs sued tire

manufacturer Goodyear USA and several of its foreign subsidiaries in
North Carolina, stemming from an accident that took place in France.53
Goodyear’s subsidiaries, based in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg,
challenged the jurisdiction of the North Carolina court.54 The lower court
in Goodyear had held that the foreign defendants were subject to general
jurisdiction in North Carolina because they had placed their product into
the stream of commerce, and their product eventually made its way into
North Carolina.55 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the plurality, first noted
that the North Carolina Court of Appeals had erred by eliding general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.56 She clarified that the metaphor of
“stream of commerce” is only appropriate when assessing whether a
defendant had certain minimum contacts with the jurisdiction to support
the exercise of specific jurisdictionthat is, jurisdiction related to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.57 Turning to the issue of general
jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the defendants’ “attenuated
connections to the State [fell] far short of the ‘the continuous and
systematic general business contacts’ necessary to empower North
Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything
that connects them to the State.”58 She noted that the paradigm bases for
general jurisdiction over a corporation are its state of incorporation and
the state of its principal place of business.59 In addition, she stated that a
court could assert general jurisdiction over a corporation where the

McDonald’s has ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts in these states and is subject to general
jurisdiction in all such states.”).
52. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
53. Id. at 2850.
54. Id. The defendant Goodyear USA did not challenge jurisdiction. Id. Arguably, in light of the
result in Goodyear itself, this was a mistake. Presumably, Goodyear USA did not contest jurisdiction
because it clearly was doing business in North Carolina and therefore believed it would be subject to
general jurisdiction. However, in light of the ultimate result in Goodyear and in particular, the Court’s
holding that general jurisdiction over a corporation is only appropriate if a corporation has continuous
and systematic general business contacts such as to render the corporation essentially “at home” there,
the concession was likely in error. See also infra note 91.
55. See Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
56. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849.
57. Id. (“The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis elided the essential difference
between case-specific and general jurisdiction. Flow of a manufacturer’s products into the forum may
bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction. . . . A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some
sorts within a state,’ International Shoe instructed, ‘is not enough to support the demand that the
corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945))).
58. Id. at 2857 (citation omitted) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
59. Id. at 2853–54.
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corporation’s affiliations with a state were “so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”60
On the facts of Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg readily concluded that the
foreign defendants were “in no sense at home in North Carolina.”61
Following Goodyear, courts and commentators debated the
meaning of the Court’s new “at home” language.62 Some argued that the
Court intended to effectuate a dramatic change in the law of general
jurisdiction, such that assertions of general jurisdiction on the basis of
continuous and systematic contacts would be rare.63 Others argued that
the Court could not have intended to do away with decades of doing
business jurisdiction precedent without explicitly acknowledging what it
was doing.64 Many courts following Goodyear actually did pay attention
to the new “at home” language, resulting in more limited assertions of
general jurisdiction.65 But some courts still “push[ed] the envelope after
Goodyear, distinguishing Goodyear and finding general personal
jurisdiction on the basis of sales (or salespeople) alone, without any other
physical presence.”66

60. Id. at 2851.
61. Id. at 2857.
62. See Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent Supreme Court
Decisions, 44 McGeorge L. Rev. 865, 875–78 (2013) (discussing a variety of different scholarly
interpretations of the “at home” language).
63. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 34, at 677 (“The Court did not specify what it meant by at home,
or address how many states could qualify with respect to a particular corporation a question that is
sure to be litigated in future cases. However, the Goodyear opinion did include several clues
suggesting that the Court may have intended the at home standard as a narrow one, perhaps extending
no further than a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business.”); Pielemeier,
supra note 37, at 991 (“In any event, a limitation of general jurisdiction over corporations to places
where they are ‘at home,’ appears clearly to envision fewer places than one could envision under tests
of ‘presence,’ ‘doing business,’ and ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts.’”).
64. See, e.g., Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and
McIntyre, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 202, 214–15, 217 (2011) (“Thus, Justice Ginsburg suggests that,
under the specific facts of Goodyear, the plaintiff’s theory of personal jurisdiction reaches far beyond
existing precedent, but she does not explicitly suggest that she intends to go further than this case
requires and reverse the multitude of lower court cases that rest general jurisdiction on direct sales to
the forum state. That result would be vastly more far reaching than what the decision in Goodyear
requires and would work a major change in lower court caselaw without consideration of the very
different facts of those cases.”).
65. See, e.g., Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1225 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating
that a celebrity gossip website’s contacts with California fell “well short of the requisite showing for
general jurisdiction”); see also Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214,
230–31 (5th Cir. 2012).
66. Sherry, supra note 8, at 118–19. See, e.g., J.B. ex rel. v. Abbott Labs. Inc., No. 12-cv-385, 2013
WL 452807, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2013) (finding general jurisdiction over a defendant pharmaceutical
company on the basis that “[b]y soliciting business, selling and marketing products, and employing a
sales team in the Southern District, Abbott could reasonably anticipate being haled into the District”;
the court indicated that “the Supreme Court [in Goodyear] did not replace or redefine the wellestablished standard for establishing general jurisdiction”); McFadden v. Fuyao N. Am., Inc., No. 10CV-14457, 2012 WL 1230046, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2012) (quoting the “at home” language
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For instance, in Hess v. Bumbo International Trust, a federal court
in Texas was faced with the question of whether to assert general
jurisdiction over a South African manufacturer of allegedly defective
infant seats.67 In Hess, Arizona plaintiffs sued Bumbo in Texas with
respect to an injury that took place in Arizona when the plaintiff’s infant
son “flipped out” of the baby seat, “fracturing his skull and requiring
extensive medical treatment.”68 The Texas court, like the court in L.L.
Bean, noted that the case was a “close call,” but nonetheless concluded
that, “despite the high threshold for general jurisdiction, the evidence in
this case establishes that Bumbo has continuous and systematic
commercial contacts with Texas sufficient to enable this Court’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction over it.”69 The court focused almost exclusively
on Bumbo’s connections with a Texas-based distributor to justify the
assertion of general jurisdiction over Bumbo.70 It noted that “a quarter
(and at certain points all) of the Bumbo Baby Seats sold in the United
States were distributed from Texas,” resulting in what the court
considered a “substantial sales presence.”71 Moreover, the distributor
was closely involved in a recall of the baby seat in 2007; it liaised with
various regulators and retail stores in order to manage Bumbo’s response
to the recall.72 According to the court, “[t]he longevity, continuity, and
volume of Bumbo’s business with its Texas-based distributor establish
the type of contacts that allow Bumbo to be considered ‘at home’ in
Texas.”73
Although the Texas court used Goodyear’s “at home” language,
one might easily question whether the court heeded the spirit of the
decision. Bumbo had no actual presence in Texas—it had no stores and
no employees in Texas.74 Instead, it selected a Texas-based distributor to
be the middleman between the corporation and various retail
establishments.75 The court did not actually analyze how many baby seats
were sold in Texas, how much of Bumbo’s revenue was derived from
Texas, whether Bumbo extensively marketed the product in Texas, or
whether Bumbo had any other Texas-based contacts. Instead, it focused
on establishing jurisdiction in Texas through the presence of an

from Goodyear but failing to apply the new standard when finding general jurisdiction over a Chinese
corporation).
67. 954 F. Supp. 2d 590, 591 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
68. Id. at 591–92.
69. Id. at 593.
70. Id. at 593–94.
71. Id. at 595. Of the 3.85 million Bumbo Baby Seats in the United States, nearly one million of
these were distributed by Bumbo’s Texas-based distributor, Wartburg Enterprises. Id. at 593.
72. Id. at 594.
73. Id. at 595.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 593–94.
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independent U.S. distributor.76 It is not clear that these connections were
the sort of connections that Justice Ginsburg in Goodyear would have
regarded as being so continuous and systematic to render Bumbo “at
home” in Texas.77
Less than two years after the Court decided Goodyear, it released
its decision in Daimler.78 Although many expected Daimler to focus on
the agency issue presented in the question for certiorari, the Court
largely ducked that question.79 Instead, the Court focused primarily on
the “at home” language that it had introduced into the general
jurisdiction discourse in Goodyear.80 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
eight-Justice majority, more explicitly stated what she had alluded to in
Goodyear: the new “at home” basis for jurisdiction was intended to
seriously restrict assertions of general jurisdiction.81 The decision, if
followed by lower courts, will officially mark the end of doing business
jurisdiction in the United States.

76. Id. at 595–96.
77. Moreover, the court acknowledged that “[t]he relationship between Bumbo and Wartburg
eventually turned sour in 2010, resulting in Bumbo filing litigation.” Id. at 594. The Hess case was
decided in 2013, three years after the relationship that formed the basis for the general jurisdiction
determination was presumably severed. This raises the independent issue of how long contacts or
affiliations between the defendant and the state can be relevant for general jurisdiction purposes.
Does the fact that Bumbo and its Texas distributor had a close relationship in, say, 2009 justify
asserting general jurisdiction over Bumbo in 2013? It surely cannot be the case that if a defendant is, at
some point, subject to general jurisdiction in a forum, it is subject to general jurisdiction forevermore
in that forum. See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1053 (“One element of general jurisdiction assessment is
the timing of the contacts. Which contacts, in terms of their timing, are relevant to general jurisdiction
analysis? The Court has not directly addressed this timing issue, but, previously, many lower courts
looked to a period of years immediately preceding and including the filing date. A period of years may
be appropriate in some cases, but the primary focus should be current contacts at the time plaintiff
filed suit. This is especially true in light of the Goodyear at-home standard.”).
78. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Daimler was released the same day as Walden
v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014), a case dealing with specific jurisdiction, which held that “the
plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s
conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its
jurisdiction over him.” For commentary on the Walden decision, see generally Genetin, supra note 8;
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 8.
79. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of “whether it violates due
process for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the
fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum
State.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965).
80. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–62.
81. See id. at 762 n.20.
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II. The Decision in DAIMLER V. BAUMAN
A. The Facts
In Daimler, Argentinian plaintiffs sued a German automaker,
DaimlerChrysler (“Daimler”), in federal court in California.82 The
plaintiffs alleged that Daimler’s wholly owned Argentinian subsidiary
had collaborated with state security forces in Argentina in kidnapping,
detaining, torturing, and killing plaintiffs and/or their relatives during
Argentina’s “Dirty War” between 1976 and 1983.83 The complaint did
not name Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary as a defendant; rather, the
plaintiffs sought to hold Daimler, the parent company, vicariously liable
for the actions of its Argentinian subsidiary.84 The plaintiffs sought to
establish jurisdiction over Daimler in California based on the presence of
a different Daimler subsidiary in California, Mercedes-Benz USA
(“MBUSA”).85 MBUSA serves as Daimler’s exclusive importer and
distributor of Mercedes-Benz automobiles in the United States.86 It is
incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in New
Jersey.87 MBUSA also has significant contacts with California.88 In
particular, it has multiple California-based facilities, including a regional
office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a
Classic Center in Irvine.89 Further, MBUSA is the largest supplier of
luxury vehicles to the California market, with over ten percent of all sales
of new vehicles in the United States taking place in California.90 Daimler
conceded91 that these contacts between MBUSA and California would
suffice to ground personal jurisdiction over MBUSA.92

82. Id. at 750–51.
83. Id. at 751.
84. Id. at 752. The plaintiffs “asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute, and the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, as well as claims for wrongful death and intentional infliction of
emotional distress under the laws of California and Argentina.” Id. at 751 (citations omitted). In light
of recent Supreme Court rulings, both federal claims in Daimler were likely to be dismissed in any
event. See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (holding that the
Alien Tort Statute does not apply extraterritorially); Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702
(2012) (holding that only a natural person is an “individual” who can be held liable under the Torture
Victim Protection Act).
85. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752. Technically, MBUSA is a subsidiary of a DaimlerChrysler North
America Holding Company, which itself is a Daimler subsidiary. Id. at 752 n.3. Thus, MBUSA is an
indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Id. at 752.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Additionally, MBUSA’s California sales constituted 2.4%of Daimler’s worldwide sales. Id.
91. The concession was likely in error given the holding in Daimler itself. See Sherry, supra
note 8, at 117 (noting that “DaimlerChrysler unwisely conceded [that MBUSA’s contacts with
California] were sufficient to satisfy the ‘continuous and systematic’ test for general jurisdiction”).
92. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 765 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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B. The Proceedings Below
After the suit was filed, Daimler moved to dismiss the action for
lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it had insufficient contacts with
California to render it subject to suit there.93 In response, the plaintiffs
filed declarations and exhibits demonstrating Daimler’s presence in
California and alternatively arguing that MBUSA’s substantial contacts
with California should be imputed to Daimler for jurisdiction purposes
on a theory of agency.94 After allowing jurisdictional discovery on the
plaintiffs’ agency allegations, the district court granted Daimler’s motion
to dismiss.95 The court found that Daimler had insufficient contacts with
California to ground general jurisdiction and that the relationship
between Daimler and MBUSA fell short of the requisite standard for
agency.96
Originally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling
solely on the basis of agency, stating that “[b]ecause there is insufficient
control and because MBUSA does not serve as [Daimler’s]
representative, the contacts of MBUSA cannot be imputed to
[Daimler].”97 The court, however, granted the plaintiffs’ petition for
rehearing and then reversed its initial holding.98 The opinion was
authored by the original dissenting judge, Judge Reinhardt, who
expressed the views outlined in his earlier dissent.99 Judge Reinhardt
stated that the imputation of contacts was appropriate because
“MBUSA’s business was sufficiently important to [Daimler] that without
MBUSA or another representative, [Daimler] would have performed
those services itself. Moreover, [Daimler] had the right to control to one
extent or another nearly every aspect of MBUSA’s business.”100 In
addition, Judge Reinhardt conducted a reasonableness inquiry and found
that Daimler “ha[d] not met its burden of presenting a compelling case
that the exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and
substantial justice.”101 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the

93. Id. at 752. In particular, Daimler claimed: (1) MBUSA’s contacts in California could not be
imputed to it because MBUSA was not Daimler’s agent; (2) without MBUSA’s contacts, Daimler
lacked sufficient contacts in California to ground general jurisdiction; and (3) even if there were
sufficient contacts with California, an assertion of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id.
94. Id.
95. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL 486389, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 12, 2007).
96. Id. at *2.
97. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2009).
98. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011); Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010).
99. See generally Bauman, 644 F.3d 909.
100. Id. at 931.
101. Id. at 930 (quoting Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d
1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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question of “whether it violates due process for a court to exercise
general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on
the fact that an indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf
of the defendant in the forum State.”102
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision
Justice Ginsburg, writing for an eight-Justice majority, concluded
that the contacts between MBUSA and California, even if imputed to
Daimler, were insufficient to ground jurisdiction over Daimler.103 After
going through a lengthy history of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
general and specific jurisdiction,104 the Court examined what many had
assumed would be the central issue in the case: when can a subsidiary’s
contacts be imputed to the parent for jurisdictional purposes?105 The
Court briefly examined the various tests that had been advanced to
answer this question.106 Daimler, for instance, had argued that a party’s
jurisdictional contacts can only be imputed to its parent when the

102. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 79, at i. Note that Daimler’s petition to the Ninth
Circuit for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied over an eight-judge dissent, despite Daimler’s
claim that the Ninth Circuit’s holding was inconsistent with Goodyear. See generally Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011). Professor Silberman commented on how “odd” it
was that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Daimler case:
It is difficult to comment on the Bauman case without noting how odd the grant of certiorari
was in the first place. The petition for certiorari was pending before the Supreme Court for
almost two years, and the Court agreed to hear the case only days after it decided Kiobel. . . .
Even if personal jurisdiction were ultimately sustained in Bauman, the claims asserted under
the Alien Tort Statute would have to be dismissed under the Kiobel precedent.
Silberman, supra note 8, at 132.
103. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2014).
104. The Court acknowledged the interplay between these two forms of jurisdiction and noted that
“[s]pecific jurisdiction has been cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway, but we have declined to stretch
general jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally recognized.” Id. at 757–58 (citing Mary Twitchell, The
Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 619, 676 (1988) (“[W]e do not need to justify broad
exercises of dispute-blind jurisdiction unless our interpretation of the scope of specific jurisdiction
unreasonably limits state authority over nonresident defendants.”)). Scholars post-Daimler have
criticized the logic that an expansion of specific jurisdiction means a contraction of general
jurisdiction. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 8, at 24–25, 25 n.102 (“[T]he Court offers no
explanation for why the constitutional expansion of one set would require a corresponding restriction
in the other. . . . The Court noted that ‘[o]ur post-International Shoe opinions on general
jurisdiction . . . are few.’ This observation does not begin to explain why the Court should limit general
jurisdiction.” (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755)); Cox, supra note 8, at 17 (“The fundamental logical
flaw the Court made, however, was to assert that this rise in specific jurisdiction cases necessarily
meant general jurisdiction must be read restrictively. A dramatic rise in the number of specific
jurisdiction cases does not automatically explain why there should be a shortening of general
jurisdiction reach.”). For additional analysis of the interplay between general and specific jurisdiction,
see generally Trammell, supra note 8.
105. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753–60.
106. Id. at 759.
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“former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego.”107 The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, had adopted a “less rigorous” agency test for
jurisdictional imputation: an agency relationship exists, and thus contacts
can be imputed, where the subsidiary “performs services that are
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a
representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would
undertake to perform substantially similar services.”108 On the facts of
Daimler, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that MBUSA’s services were
“important” to Daimler, as evidenced by Daimler’s “hypothetical
readiness to perform those services itself if MBUSA did not exist.”109
The Court rejected this latter test as being one that “stacks the deck, for
it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer.”110 It noted that anything
that a corporation does via an intermediary, such as an independent
contractor, subsidiary, or distributor, is presumably something that the
corporation would otherwise have done itself in the absence of that
intermediary.111 The Court did not, however, endorse the alter ego test
for imputation—or any other test for that matter.112 Instead, it declared
that “we need not pass judgment on the invocation of an agency theory
in the context of general jurisdiction, for in no event can the appeals
court’s analysis be sustained.”113
With no more direction on the imputation issue which was thought
to be the reason for granting certiorari in the case, the Court proceeded
with the analysis, concluding that even if one assumes that MBUSA is
subject to general jurisdiction in California, and even if one assumes that
MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler, there still would be no
basis for general jurisdiction over Daimler in California.114 Thus, the rest
of the opinion was premised on MBUSA being subject to general

107. Id. Accord Brief for Petitioner at 12, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965) (“Attributing a
subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts to its parent only when the two companies are truly alter egos
affords defendants the certainty and predictability that due process requires and ensures that
defendants are subject to suit only in those jurisdictions in which they themselves possess the requisite
minimum contacts. Here, because it is undisputed that Daimler AG and MBUSA are not alter egos,
the jurisdictional contacts of MBUSA may not be attributed to Daimler AG.”).
108. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915,
928 (9th Cir. 2001)).
109. Id. at 749.
110. Id. at 759.
111. Id. at 759–60. This position was also advanced by Professor Brilmayer in her Brief in Support
of Petitioner. See Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner at 14,
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965) (“After all, whenever this ‘test’ is invoked, it is likely to generate
a pro-jurisdiction outcome. It is difficult to conceive what, if anything, this definition of agency
excludes. If a service was cost-effective enough to have been arranged in the first place, why wouldn’t
Daimler want to either establish in-house capacity or else hire a replacement?”).
112. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758–60.
113. Id. at 759.
114. Id. at 760.
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jurisdiction in California (on the basis that it was “at home” there) and
on the contacts which rendered it “at home” in California being
imputable to Daimler.
At this point, Justice Ginsburg took the opportunity to revisit the
Court’s decision in Goodyear, which she had penned a few years
earlier.115 She stated that Goodyear made it plain that only a limited set
of affiliations with a state would subject a defendant to general
jurisdiction there.116 With respect to corporations, “the place of
incorporation and principal place of business are the ‘paradig[m] . . .
bases for general jurisdiction.’”117 The Court noted that “[t]hose
affiliations have the virtue of being unique—that is, each ordinarily
indicates only one place—as well as easily ascertainable.”118 It also
observed that “[t]hese bases afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one
clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be sued on
any and all claims.”119 The Court stressed the exceptionality of the “at
home” basis for general jurisdiction, stating that it did not “foreclose the
possibility that in an exceptional case” general jurisdiction could be
asserted over a corporation in a state other than its state of incorporation
or principal place of business.120 The Court stated very briefly, and in a
footnote, that the “at home” inquiry calls for “an appraisal of a
corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.”121 It
elaborated that “a corporation that operates in many places can scarcely
be deemed at home in all of them.”122
On the facts, the Court concluded that Daimler’s “slim contacts”
with California meant that it was not “at home” there.123 The Court did
not specifically address exactly what these slim contacts were or why they
were not sufficient to render Daimler “at home” in California. Rather, it

115. Id. at 760–61. The plaintiffs in their brief had implored the Court to focus on the issue
presented in the case (that of agency) and not use this case as an opportunity to revisit the Goodyear
“at home” standard. See Brief for the Respondents at 15–16, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965)
(“This Court should reject any effort (direct or subtle) to provoke a decision on the standard for
general jurisdiction. Any such argument was forfeited below and not adequately raised in the petition
for certiorari. Nor has the question percolated in the lower courts since this Court’s decision in
Goodyear two terms ago. And neither the parties nor the Government has adequately briefed the
issue.”). Professor Cox observes that the parties in Daimler focused their submissions on issues that
the Court ended up choosing not to deal with. Cox, supra note 8, at 13. According to Cox, had there
been “focused adversarial argument” on the issue of the appropriate test for general jurisdiction, this
“might have sharpened the Daimler Court’s thinking.” Id.
116. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–61.
117. Id. at 760 (quoting Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 735).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 761 n.19.
121. Id. at 762 n.20.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 761–62.
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cited concerns about predictability and exorbitant assertions of
jurisdiction to justify its conclusion that California did not have general
jurisdiction over Daimler.124 The Court also pointed to the
“transnational” context of the dispute to bolster its conclusion that
jurisdiction was not appropriate.125 It observed that an expansive
approach to personal jurisdiction could pose a “risk[] to international
comity” and that “other nations do not share the uninhibited approach to
personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case.”126
Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit,
holding that the assertion of general jurisdiction over Daimler would
violate due process.127
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the result—that there was no
general jurisdiction over Daimler in California—but for very different
reasons.128 Justice Sotomayor would have dismissed the case on the basis
that the assertion of jurisdiction over Daimler was unreasonable.129 She
stated that the inquiry into jurisdiction consists of two parts, contacts and
reasonableness, and that the inquiry is the same whether one is dealing
with general or specific jurisdiction.130 She noted that the case involved
Argentinian plaintiffs suing a German defendant for conduct that took
place in Argentina and that the plaintiffs failed to show that it would be
more convenient to litigate in California, rather than Germany, a country
with a far greater interest in resolving the dispute.131
Even though Justice Sotomayor would have decided the case on the
basis that the assertion of jurisdiction would have been unreasonable, she
felt it necessary to address the Court’s holding on the “at home” test.132
For Justice Sotomayor, the “at home” test does not involve looking at a
corporation’s nationwide or worldwide activities and comparing them to
the corporation’s activities in the forum.133 Rather, the “at home” test

124. Id.
125. Id. at 762–63.
126. Id. at 763.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 763–64 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 764–65 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The majority did not believe that the
reasonableness prong for jurisdiction applied when dealing with assertions of general jurisdiction. Id.
at 762 n.20.
131. Id. at 765 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). But see Brief of Amici Curiae German Institute for
Human Rights & Other German Legal Experts in Support of Respondents at 2–3, Daimler, 134 S. Ct.
746 (No. 11-965) (“For the respondent victims of serious violations of internationally-recognized
human rights in this case, and for others like them, Germany is an inadequate alternative forum.
German courts would apply the harsh limitation period of the lex loci damni, and German law imposes
additional logistical and financial hurdles on non-European plaintiffs that effectively close off the
German courts to the respondents in this case.”).
132. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 766–67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 767 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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looks solely at the magnitude of the defendant’s forum contacts, not the
relative magnitude of those contacts vis-à-vis the defendant’s contacts
with other forums.134 Justice Sotomayor stated that if the Court had
applied the appropriate approach to general jurisdiction, it would have
had “little trouble” concluding that Daimler’s California contacts,
imputed from MBUSA, rendered Daimler “at home” in California.135 In
other words, if MBUSA was “at home” in California and those contacts
were imputed to Daimler, then Daimler would also be “at home” in
California. For Justice Sotomayor, a corporation could be “at home” in
multiple places, so long as it enjoyed extensive benefits in those places
such that it should be subject to the burden of litigating there.136

III. Key Points of Disagreement
The two opinions, although they come to the same ultimate result,
diverge considerably in their reasoning and implications. Although
Daimler was a decisive 8-1 “win” for the majority, the points elucidated
by Justice Sotomayor in the concurrence represent a very different way
of conceptualizing general jurisdiction, and accordingly, both opinions
are worth exploring in detail.
Interestingly, much of the substantive discussion in Daimler takes
place in the footnotes. In total, there are thirty-two footnotes in Daimler,
many of them fairly extensive.137 Moreover, the opinions are replete with
“footnote jabs” between Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor;138
presumably, the opinions were written independently, and then footnotes
were added to respond specifically to the arguments of the other side.

134. See id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 769 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 768–89, 771 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
137. See generally id.
138. The tone of the judgment is rather caustic at times. See id. at 756 n.8 (accusing Justice Sotomayor
of “selectively referring to the trial court record in Perkins”); id. at 758 n.10 (stating that “[r]emarkably,
Justice Sotomayor treats specific jurisdiction as through it were barely there”); id. at 760 n.16 (stating that
Justice Sotomayor’s assertion that the majority strayed from the question on which it granted certiorari is
“doubly flawed”); id. at 262 n.20 (stating that Justice Sotomayor “favors a resolution fit for this day and
case only”); id. at 764 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that “without the benefit of a single page of
briefing on the issue, the majority casually adds each of these cases to the mounting list of decisions
jettisoned as a consequence of today’s ruling”); id. at 765 n.2 (stating that “although the majority frets that
deciding this case on the reasonableness ground would be ‘a resolution fit for this day and case only,’ I do
not understand our constitutional duty to require otherwise”); id. at 768 n.7 (stating that “[t]he majority
suggests that I misinterpret language in Perkins that I do not even cite”). One particular article on
Daimler focused less on the substance of the case and more on the ad hominem nature of the debate
between the two Justices: “For those readers not interested in studying this basic doctrine, what might be
of greater interest is Ginsburg’s manifest impatience with what she evidently regards as Sotomayor’s utter
cluelessness. . . . Sotomayor, I will add, fires back.” Ed Whelan, Court Ruling Invites Scathing Criticism?,
Nat’l Rev. (Jan. 14, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/368445/court-rulinginvites-scathing-criticism-ed-whelan.

Monestier_21 (Teixeira CORRECTED).DOC (Do Not Delete)

254

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

11/26/2014 2:22 PM

[Vol. 66:233

Thus, much of the “meat” in Daimler is curiously absent from the text of
the opinions themselves, but instead found in the footnotes.
Below, I discuss the three main areas of disagreement between the
majority and the concurrence: the nature of the test for general
jurisdiction; the meaning of the words “at home”; and the propriety of
analyzing the reasonableness factors for the assertion of general
jurisdiction.
A. An Absolute or Comparative Test for General Jurisdiction?
The most significant difference of opinion between the majority and
the concurrence derives from the question of how to assess the contacts
between a forum and a corporation for the purposes of general
jurisdiction—in absolute or comparative terms. Although not phrased in
this manner, the Court holds that the test is a comparative one: what are
the corporation’s contacts with the forum state vis-à-vis its contacts with
other states (or countries)? The Court does not address this issue in the
text of the actual opinion, but instead relegates it to a footnote.139 In
footnote 20, the Court writes, “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not
‘focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.’
General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s
activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.”140 Presumably,
the Court’s view is that while Daimler’s contacts with California, through
its subsidiary, might have been substantial in and of themselves, they
were not particularly significant when viewed against the backdrop of
Daimler’s worldwide operations. Accordingly, Daimler, even if it has
significant contacts with California, is nonetheless not “at home” in
California. Indeed, the adoption of the comparative test for general
jurisdiction—an examination of the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state in relation to its nationwide and worldwide contacts—is the main
take-away from the case.
Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, is of the view that the “at
home” test for general jurisdiction is not a comparative one, but rather
an absolute one. Once a corporation meets some requisite level of
connection with the forum (through its stores, employees, sales,
marketing, and the like), then the corporation is “at home” in the forum
and is subject to general jurisdiction there.141 She notes that “[i]n every
case where we have applied [the continuous and systematic general
business contacts] test, we have focused solely on the magnitude of the
defendant’s in-state contacts, not the relative magnitude of those

139. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
140. Id. (quoting id. at 767 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
141. Id. at 767–70 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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contacts in comparison to the defendant’s contacts with other States.”142
She illustrates this point by discussing Helicopteros, Perkins, and
Goodyear, noting that in each of these cases, the Supreme Court did not
focus on the defendant’s contacts with other states, but rather its contacts
(or lack thereof) with the forum state seeking to assert general
jurisdiction.143 She continues:
When a corporation chooses to invoke the benefits and protections of a
State in which it operates, the State acquires the authority to subject
the company to suit in its courts. The majority’s focus on the extent of
a corporate defendant’s out-of-forum contacts is untethered from this
rationale. After all, the degree to which a company intentionally
benefits from a forum State depends on its interactions with that State,
not its interactions elsewhere. An article on which the majority
relies . . . expresses the point well: “We should not treat defendants as
less amenable to suit merely because they carry on more substantial
business in other states. . . . [T]he amount of activity elsewhere seems
virtually irrelevant to . . . the imposition of general jurisdiction over a
defendant.”144

Justice Sotomayor then follows through with the logical
consequence of her position: If MBUSA’s contacts with California
render it “at home” there, and those contacts are imputed to Daimler,
then so too is Daimler “at home” in California.145 Both entities, in other
words, have surpassed the threshold of contacts required to sustain
general personal jurisdiction in California. Justice Sotomayor points to
what she considers the absurdity of the Court’s holding:
The problem, the Court says, is not that Daimler’s contacts with
California are too few, but that its contacts with other forums are too
many. In other words, the Court does not dispute that the presence of
multiple offices, the direct distribution of thousands of products
accounting for billions of dollars in sales, and continuous interaction
with customers throughout a State would be enough to support the
exercise of general jurisdiction over some businesses. Daimler is just
not one of those businesses, the Court concludes, because its California

142. Id. at 767 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 767–68 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 768–69 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Brilmayer et al., supra
note 11, at 742).
145. Id. at 769–70 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Had the majority applied our settled approach, it
would have had little trouble concluding that Daimler’s California contacts rise to the requisite level,
given the majority’s assumption that MBUSA’s contacts may be attributed to Daimler and given
Daimler’s concession that those contacts render MBUSA ‘at home’ in California. . . . Under this
standard, Daimler’s concession that MBUSA is subject to general jurisdiction in California (a
concession the Court accepts, ante, at 758, 759) should be dispositive. For if MBUSA’s California
contacts are so substantial and the resulting benefits to MBUSA so significant as to make MBUSA ‘at
home’ in California, the same must be true of Daimler when MBUSA’s contacts and benefits are
viewed as its own.”).
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contacts must be viewed in the context of its extensive “nationwide and
worldwide” operations.146

The Court’s adoption of a comparative test functions to create a
much higher standard for the assertion of general jurisdiction than
previously existed. Not only does the defendant have to have continuous
and systematic contacts with the forum, but those contacts must be more
significant than the contacts it has with other states or countries. Only
where the contacts with the forum are much greater than the contacts the
corporation has with other forums (such that one can regard the
corporation as “at home”) will the assertion of general jurisdiction be
justified. Accordingly, the Court’s comparative approach to the
continuous and systematic inquiry has the effect of dramatically reining
in general jurisdiction. On the other hand, Justice Sotomayor’s absolute
approach would essentially preserve the status quo. If a corporation has a
sufficient level of contacts with a state, then that state will possess
general jurisdiction over the corporation irrespective of the corporation’s
contacts elsewhere. So which approach to general jurisdiction is the
“right” one? Should general jurisdiction be a comparative inquiry or an
absolute one? Should assertions of general jurisdiction be broad or narrow?
On balance, it appears that Justice Sotomayor has the better
argument based on legal precedent, while the Court has the better
argument based on policy. Justice Sotomayor is correct in her view that,
according to past Supreme Court precedent, the continuous and
systematic inquiry is an absolute one.147 Once the defendant has a certain
threshold of contacts with the forum, that forum has general jurisdiction
over the defendant. The fact that the defendant also has contacts with
other forums has largely been irrelevant in the general jurisdiction
analysis.148 It is the unique relationship between the forum state and the
defendant that gives the state the right to adjudicate any and all disputes
concerning the defendant; the fact that the defendant may also have that

146. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (observing that much like the concept that
multinational corporations are “too big to fail,” the consequence of the majority’s holding is that
multinational corporations like Daimler are “too big for general jurisdiction”).
147. See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
148. In Gator.com v. L.L. Bean and Hess v. Bumbo, for instance, the courts did not look at the
defendants’ contacts with other jurisdictions in assessing whether or not the defendants were subject to
general jurisdiction in the forum. Rather, the courts concentrated solely on whether the defendants
had the requisite level of contacts with California and Texas, respectively, to ground general
jurisdiction. See Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003); Hess v. Bumbo Int’l
Trust, 954 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

Monestier_21 (Teixeira CORRECTED).DOC (Do Not Delete)

December 2014]

11/26/2014 2:22 PM

WHERE IS HOME DEPOT “AT HOME”?

257

same, or a similar, relationship with another state has generally been of
no moment in the general jurisdiction analysis.149
With that said, it is unclear that continuous and systematic general
business contacts (or, in more common vernacular, doing business) was
ever an appropriate basis for general jurisdiction. Many commentators
have questioned the conceptual basis for this ground of jurisdiction. For
example, Professor Erichson starts off a recent article with the following
statement:
What, if anything, gives a state sufficiently plenary power over a person
that the state may adjudicate claims against the person even if the
claims arose elsewhere? Particularly with regard to corporations, this
basic question has lacked a clear answer. The standard for general
jurisdiction remains unsatisfactorily vague, with ambiguous Supreme
Court guidance on doctrine and even less explanation of why such
jurisdiction exists.150

Other commentators have also struggled to provide a compelling
justification for general jurisdiction based on the defendant’s continuous
and systematic contacts with the forum.151 In fact, one professor whose
thoughts on doing business jurisdiction were published in the Harvard
Law Review had a self-proclaimed “change of heart” on the topic but
nonetheless had a hard time finding a compelling theoretical rationale
for the doctrine and a workable solution as to how to implement it in
practice.152
Leaving aside its murky conceptual basis, there are at least three
important policy reasons why it makes sense to circumscribe general
jurisdiction in the way that the Court has done. First, an expansive
interpretation of general jurisdiction poses risks to international comity.
The Court asserts, quite correctly, that “[o]ther nations do not share the
uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the Court of

149. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 743 (“Significantly, for purposes of general jurisdiction,
the relevant issue is the absolute amount of activity, not the amount of activity relative to what the
defendant does outside the state.”).
150. Erichson, supra note 8, at 81–82. In Professor Erichson’s next sentence, referring to Daimler,
he states, “[t]he coming Supreme Court term offers the Court an opportunity to clarify.” Id. at 82.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Daimler did not provide much in the way of theoretical guidance
or justification for general jurisdiction. See also Cox, supra note 8, at 17 (“The most disappointing
aspects of the Daimler Court’s approach to general jurisdiction relate to its lack of any foundational
explanation for the doctrine, and its unwillingness to address tensions between its assumptions and
personal jurisdiction case law more generally. Although the Daimler Court’s instincts about general
jurisdiction were correct, it failed to pursue those instincts towards any broader theoretical
explanation of personal jurisdiction doctrine.”).
151. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 16; Brilmayer et al., supra note 11; Twitchell, supra note 104.
152. See Twitchell, supra note 104, at 630–43 (criticizing the elastic use of doing business as a basis for
general jurisdiction); Twitchell, supra note 33, at 171–72 (discussing a “change of heart” concerning general
jurisdiction and suggesting a more guided approach where “such jurisdiction is permitted only if the state
would be justified in deciding a claim that is wholly unrelated to the defendant’s forum contacts”).
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Appeals in this case.”153 The Court points to the fact that under the
Brussels Regulation, which governs jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in the European Union, a corporation may generally be sued
in the nation in which it is “‘domiciled,’ a term defined to refer only to
the location of the corporation’s ‘statutory seat,’ ‘central administration,’
or ‘principal place of business.’”154 It also observes that past negotiations
for a worldwide treaty on the enforcement of judgments have been
impeded, in part, due to foreign perceptions that U.S. courts have
adopted overly “expansive views of general jurisdiction.”155 In addition,
the Court notes a particular concern expressed by the amici in Daimler
that unpredictable assertions of general jurisdiction over U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign corporations could discourage foreign
investment.156 For the Court, all of these foreign policy considerations
militate against overly expansive assertions of general jurisdiction and
reinforce the Court’s determination that subjecting Daimler to
jurisdiction in California would not be consistent with due process.
Second, overly broad assertions of general jurisdiction based on a
corporation doing business in a forum would lead to unpredictable
results for defendants. A corporate defendant would never know with
certainty if its conduct met the “magical” threshold necessary to
constitute continuous and systematic general business contacts.157 Thus,
for the Court, the notion that assertions of general jurisdiction should be
predictable is at the epicenter of the decision. Justice Sotomayor takes
issue with the predictability rationale, positing that “there is nothing
unpredictable about a rule that instructs multinational corporations that
if they engage in continuous and substantial contacts with more than one
State, they will be subject to general jurisdiction in each one.”158 She

153. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
154. Id. Accord Commission Regulation 44/2001, art. 5(5), 2011 O.J. (L 12) 4 (EU) (“[A]s regards
a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment [a corporation may
be sued] in the courts for the place where the branch, agency or other establishment is situated.”
(emphasis added)).
155. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763. See also Brief for the Respondents, supra note 115, at 35
(acknowledging that the doing business basis for general jurisdiction has led to “international
friction”); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 89,
95–96 (1999) (“The Europeans’ principal objection to U.S. jurisdictional law is its proclivity to base
general jurisdiction on rather thin contacts.”).
156. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (citing Brief for the Respondents, supra note 115, at 35; Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965)).
157. See id. at 761–62 (“If Daimler’s California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this
Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every
other State in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable. Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction
would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants ‘to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.’” (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985))).
158. Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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reasons that “[t]he majority may not favor that rule as a matter of policy,
but such disagreement does not render an otherwise routine test
unpredictable.”159 What Justice Sotomayor overlooks is that, in its
application, the continuous and systematic test has been unpredictable.
The results of lower courts are incredibly variable—with some courts
subjecting a corporation with relatively few contacts to general
jurisdiction and other courts not subjecting a corporation with quite
significant contacts to general jurisdiction. A test with a higher threshold
of connection, such as the “at home” test in Daimler, would, or should,
lead to increased predictability for defendants.160
Third, broad assertions of general jurisdiction encourage forum
shopping.161 Arguably, as a matter of policy, U.S. courts should not be
open for business to out-of-state or out-of-country plaintiffs whose cause
of action has nothing to do with the defendant’s connections to the
forum.162 The Court provides an example of what it would consider to be
an “exorbitant” exercise of jurisdiction: a California court asserting
jurisdiction over Daimler, a German company, in a design defect lawsuit
brought by Polish plaintiffs who were injured by a Daimler vehicle in
Poland.163 The Court’s concerns make sense and are reflected in much of
the commentary on general jurisdiction over the past few decades.164
There is something seemingly unpalatable about having defendants
answer in a forum that has nothing to do with the underlying dispute.165

159. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
160. This is already being borne out by the post-Daimler case law. See infra pp. 271–73.
161. Professor Sherry argues that Daimler itself presents a “paradigmatic example of egregious
forum shopping.” Sherry, supra note 8, at 111. Accord Childress, Transnational Law Market, supra
note 8, at 68 (“As much as [Daimler] is about general jurisdiction, it is also about the growth of a
transnational law market where plaintiffs shop the world for favorable courts and law, and states and
defendants respond to that forum shopping.”).
162. The concern is particularly acute for foreign country defendants who Professor Twitchell
argued were “appalled to find that general jurisdiction exposure is the price of doing regular business
in U.S. markets.” Twitchell, supra note 33, at 197.
163. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751, 754 n.5.
164. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially At Home” in Goodyear Dunlop,
63 S.C. L. Rev. 527, 540–41 (2012) (“A handful of judicial districts across the country have become
magnets for litigation against large, interstate corporations because of their tendency to render large
jury awards. The more permissive the constitutional standards for the exercise of general jurisdiction,
the more these problems arise. Accordingly, as a matter of sound policy and fairness, there is a
practical need to constrain general jurisdiction. And as long as the plaintiff is able to pursue a
defendant in its home forum, there is little necessity for expanding the options to include multiple
jurisdictions that have no connection to the underlying controversy.”).
165. In endorsing a restrained approach to general jurisdiction, the Court emphasizes that general
jurisdiction is exceptional in that it allows for the assertion of state power in cases having nothing to do
with the state. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 (“It was therefore error for the Ninth Circuit to conclude that
Daimler, even with MBUSA’s contacts attributed to it, was at home in California, and hence subject to
suit there on claims by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything that occurred or had its
principal impact in California.” (emphasis added)); id. at 762 n.20 (“Nothing in International Shoe and
its progeny suggests that ‘a particular quantum of local activity’ should give a State authority over a

Monestier_21 (Teixeira CORRECTED).DOC (Do Not Delete)

260

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

11/26/2014 2:22 PM

[Vol. 66:233

While we may be comfortable having that forum be limited to two places
(place of incorporation or principal place of business), we are not as
comfortable having that forum be “anywhere and everywhere.”166 To
allow assertions of general jurisdiction in a forum because the defendant
is doing business in the forum seems to reward plaintiffs for
gamesmanship. If a plaintiff can find a forum where the defendant is
doing business, she can sue there over something that happened in the
state next door, and be rewarded through the application of the forum’s
procedural (and perhaps substantive) law.167 Thus, it was likely that
underlying policy considerations related to forum shopping shaped the
Court’s ultimate conclusion and reasoning.
B. What Is the Meaning of “At Home”?
It follows from the above that the majority and the concurrence also
differ in the meaning that they ascribe to the two most important words
in Goodyear: “at home.” The Supreme Court in Goodyear had qualified
the continuous and systematic general business contacts test for general
jurisdiction with the phrase “at home.”168 Thus, general jurisdiction was
only appropriate where a corporation had continuous and systematic
general business contacts such that it could fairly be regarded to be “at
home.”169 In the months following Goodyear, commentators debated the
meaning of these two words and questioned whether the Supreme Court
really intended to change the test for general jurisdiction over
corporations.170
In Daimler, Justice Ginsburg’s message was clear: when I said “at
home” in Goodyear, I really meant “at home.”171 According to the
‘far larger quantum of . . . activity’ having no connection to any in-state activity.” (emphasis added)
(quoting Feder, supra note 34, at 694)).
166. See id. at 762 n.20.
167. See, for example, Ferens v. John Deere, 494 U.S. 516 (1990), which Professor Stein described
as “[t]he poster-child for the cost of general jurisdiction” and “an unmitigated train wreck.” Stein,
supra note 164, at 540.
168. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 8, at 88 (stating that “the Court [in Goodyear] qualified its
language in ways that could call into question whether it meant to adopt a home-state test”); Feder,
supra note 34, at 672 (stating that it has been suggested “that the apparent implications of Goodyear
are so significant that they cannot have been intended—that the Court’s apparent restriction of
general jurisdiction to corporations that are ‘essentially at home’ should be dismissed as ‘loose
language,’ and that Goodyear should be limited to its ‘particular facts’”); see also supra notes 62–64
and accompanying text.
171. Professors Rhodes and Robertson argue that the Court’s language in Daimler was more
direct than Goodyear. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 8, at 10 n.35 (“In Goodyear, the Court
described general jurisdiction as appropriate in fora in which the defendant was ‘essentially at home,’
‘fairly regarded as at home,’ or ‘in [a] sense at home.’ In a judicial sleight of hand, [ Daimler] dropped
the qualifications from Goodyear and instead phrased the governing injury as merely whether the
defendant was ‘at home.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54, 2857).
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Court, the “at home” language is intended to be a significant limitation
on the scope of general jurisdiction.172 The Court states that “[a]
corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at
home in all of them.”173 To be “at home,” the corporation must have a
relationship with the state which approximates that between a state and a
local enterprise.174 Accordingly, it would be an “exceptional” case where
a corporation could be “at home” in a place other than its state of
incorporation or the state of its principal place of business.175 The Court’s
view of “at home” directly correlates to its adoption of a comparative
test for general jurisdiction. One can only assess whether a corporation is
“at home” when one considers what other homes a corporation might
have. Thus, it is only through this comparative exercise that one can
ascertain the strength and significance of the connection between the
corporation and the forum state.
Justice Sotomayor would ascribe a very different meaning to “at
home.” In Justice Sotomayor’s view, as long as a corporation
“enjoy[s] . . . extensive benefits in multiple forum States[,] it is ‘essentially
at home’ in each one.”176 Thus, for Justice Sotomayor, there is nothing
particularly significant about the catch-phrase that the Court repeatedly
invokes. For her, a corporation is “at home” where it does business in a
state such that it is enjoying the benefits of the state and therefore should
be subject to its burdens.177 Although Justice Sotomayor signed on to the
judgment in Goodyear which added the new “at home” language to the
continuous and systematic inquiry, she apparently did not intend for it to
be a paradigm shift in the law of general jurisdiction. Both Justices use
the Perkins case to illustrate their intended meaning of “at home”; not
surprisingly, both have very different reads on the underlying facts in
Perkins and the conclusions to be drawn from those facts.178
The Court’s position hews closer to an intuitive understanding of
the concept of “home.” The idea of “home”—closely associated with the
legal construct of domicile179—usually only connotes one place, or at

172. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760–61 (2014).
173. Id. at 762 n.20.
174. See id. at 758 n.11 (“As the Court made plain in Goodyear and repeats here, general
jurisdiction requires affiliations ‘so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the foreign corporation]
essentially at home in the forum State.’ i.e., comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.”
(citation omitted) (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851)).
175. See id. at 761 n.19.
176. Id. at 771 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 768–69 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
178. Compare id. at 756–57, 756 n.8, 761 n.19, with id. at 767–68, 767 n.5, 768 n.7, 769 n.8
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
179. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise
of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in
which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 728));
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least a limited number of places. In this respect, it is difficult to conceive
of “home” as being anywhere and everywhere that a defendant does
business.180 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation is difficult to
justify from a pure interpretation standpoint. If the “at home” language
was intended to be essentially superfluous, why add it to the test? If the
test is interpreted as Justice Sotomayor suggests, how is “continuous and
systematic” any different than “continuous and systematic such that a
corporation is ‘at home’”? It seems that the latter formulation of general
jurisdiction must be a different test than the former. Accordingly, the
gloss put on the “at home” test by the Court is more readily defensible
than that put on it by Justice Sotomayor.
C. A Reasonableness Inquiry for General Jurisdiction?
The majority and the concurrence also disagree on whether the
reasonableness check on jurisdiction applies only to specific jurisdiction,
or also applies to general jurisdiction.181 In earlier cases, in particular

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, the Court
adopted a two-pronged test for the assertion of jurisdiction over a
defendant.182 The contacts prong of the test looks at whether the
defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum to support the exercise

see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 733 (“The law treats corporations like legal persons, and the
place of incorporation and the principal place of business are both analogous to domicile.”).
180. Professor Stein offers an account of “at home” for corporations based upon a loose analogy to
the concept of “home” for individuals. Stein, supra note 164, at 543. In his words:
A corporation no more has a home, in the sense that a person does, than it has feet. But I
think there is an apt corporate analogue to the out-of-state discomfort that I experience: the
notion of being an outsider to the legal community provides an appropriate measure of
jurisdictional overreaching. The touchstone of the inquiry under this approach is to consider
whether the judge or jury would view imposition of liability on the defendant to be an
externality—a cost that would not be internalized by the forum community.

Id. But cf. Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 8, at 64 (“The family imagery suggested by ‘home,’
reinforced, perhaps unintentionally, by the Latin roots for ‘affiliation,’ seems uniquely inappropriate
for the analogical work the images are asked to perform. International Shoe insisted that corporations
do not even occupy space so as to establish ‘presence’ apart from the legal acts society empowers them
to perform through agents. It should be unnecessary to add the same corporations do not make homes
with fireplaces or form family relationships. Adopting anthropomorphizing metaphors does not aid
analysis but does leave the Court’s opinions open to ridicule.”).
181. Both parties in their briefs assumed that the reasonableness test would apply to questions of
general jurisdiction. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 107, at 37–39 (arguing that the assertion of
general jurisdiction was per se unreasonable); Brief for the Respondents, supra note 115, at 11
(arguing for a case-specific reasonableness inquiry). Some commentators also believed that a
reasonableness check would apply to assertions of general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 8,
at 119–20.
182. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108–15 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–77 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
291–92 (1980).
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of personal jurisdiction, while the reasonableness prong looks at whether
the assertion of jurisdiction in the circumstances would be
unreasonable.183 Although the test was articulated in cases involving
specific jurisdiction, many lower courts had applied the inquiry to all
assertions of jurisdiction, including general jurisdiction.184
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the status of the
Asahi reasonableness factors for specific jurisdiction had been somewhat
uncertain in the aftermath of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.185
In Nicastro, none of the Justices mentioned the reasonableness factors,
leading some to question whether the Court intended to eliminate them
from the specific jurisdiction inquiry.186 In Daimler, both the majority
and concurrence confirmed that the reasonableness prong of the specific
jurisdiction test is alive and well.187
In Daimler, Justice Sotomayor would have resolved the dispute on
the basis of the Asahi reasonableness factors.188 For Justice Sotomayor,
the inherently foreign nature of the dispute counseled against the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Daimler—even though for her, the
assertion of personal jurisdiction against Daimler would have been
constitutionally permissible.189 The Court, on the other hand, is of the
view that the reasonableness test applies only to assertions of specific
jurisdiction, not to assertions of general jurisdiction.190 This is because

183. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. For an articulation of the reasonableness factors, see Asahi,
480 U.S. at 113 (“A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State,
and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination ‘the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.’” (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted))).
184. See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 713 (8th Cir. 2003); Base Metal Training,
Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,” 283 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Roberston-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 568–69 (2d Cir. 1996); Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench
Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996); Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Nav. Co., 1 F.3d
848, 851 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993); Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1990);
Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 1987).
185. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). Although the Court first articulated the reasonableness factors in
World-Wide Volkswagen, the factors are more commonly referred to as the “Asahi reasonableness
factors.” See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
186. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum
Contacts Test, 44 Creighton L. Rev. 1245, 1265–66 (2011) (“[L]eft unclear is the status of the
independent reasonableness test that the Court explicitly adopted in Asahi . . . none of the opinions in J.
McIntyre (or Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown for that matter) even mentioned it.”).
187. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20; id. at 765 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 765 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 762 n.20 (“True, a multipronged reasonableness check was articulated in Asahi, but not as
a free-floating test. Instead, the check was to be essayed when specific jurisdiction is at issue. First, a court
is to determine whether the connection between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify the
exercise of specific jurisdiction. Then, in a second step, the court is to consider several additional factors
to assess the reasonableness of entertaining the case.” (citations omitted)) .
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the nature of general jurisdiction is such that it is de facto fair and
reasonable to require a defendant to answer to suit in that particular
forum. In Justice Ginsburg’s words, “[w]hen a corporation is genuinely at
home in the forum State, however, any second-step [reasonableness]
inquiry would be superfluous.”191
Each Justice’s view of the propriety of the reasonableness inquiry
for general jurisdiction stems from her respective view of the appropriate
scope for general jurisdiction. For the Court, a reasonableness inquiry is
unnecessary when the underlying test for general jurisdiction has been
severely circumscribed.192 In other words, since there will be very few
cases that satisfy the Court’s “at home” test, there is no need to engage in
a reasonableness check on jurisdiction. The fact that the test is satisfied
means that it is per se reasonable to assume general jurisdiction.193 For
Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, the still-expansive nature of the
general jurisdiction test she endorses in Daimler would benefit from a
reasonableness check.194 Given that a corporation could be “at home” in
many different places, the reasonableness prong provides a necessary
safeguard against exorbitant and inappropriate assertions of
jurisdiction.195
To Justice Sotomayor’s credit, a reasonableness check on general
jurisdiction could alleviate some of the Court’s stated concerns about
international comity and forum shopping.196 In cases where the assertion
of jurisdiction would offend international comity or reward forum
shopping, courts would have the discretion to apply the reasonableness
factors and decline to exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant.
However, the reasonableness factors would vest courts with a great deal
of discretion, thereby undermining the predictability that the Court
sought to foster by adopting a new standard for general jurisdiction.
Defendants would never be able to predict with any degree of certainty
(1) whether there was general jurisdiction under the absolute approach,

191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 93 (“If general jurisdiction is sensibly confined to home-state
defendants, there should be no need for a reasonableness prong. The very idea of general jurisdiction is
that a state’s adjudicatory power over its own citizens is reasonable, without regard to the particularities
of the case. . . . Application of the reasonableness prong to general jurisdiction is an artifact of an
overenthusiastic embrace of ‘doing business’ jurisdiction. The home-state test should eliminate the need
for this prong by eliminating the problematic assertions of power that it was meant to address.”).
194. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764–65 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
195. See Silberman, supra note 8, at 131 (noting that doing business jurisdiction “presents the
strongest case for ‘reasonableness’ scrutiny because it offers a potential curb on the forum-shopping
opportunities that such general jurisdiction presents”).
196. See supra Part III.A.
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and (2) whether a court would choose to exercise jurisdiction after
applying the reasonableness factors.197
Moreover, it appears from pre-Daimler case law applying the
reasonableness factors to general jurisdiction that courts rarely used the
factors to limit the exercise of general jurisdiction. Once a court
determined that a defendant had continuous and systematic general
business contacts with a state, it almost always followed that the exercise
of general jurisdiction was appropriate.198 In Gator.com, for instance,
even though the Ninth Circuit observed that general jurisdiction over the
defendant was “a close question,” it nonetheless determined that the
exercise of general jurisdiction would not be unreasonable.199
Accordingly, a reasonableness check on general jurisdiction—although
an interesting solution in theory—would likely not rein in general
jurisdiction in the way that the Court in Daimler actually intended.200
***
Although Daimler was unanimous in its holding that a California
court could not assume jurisdiction over the defendant, the reasoning of
the majority and concurrence could not be more different. The Court in
Daimler conceptualizes general jurisdiction in a radically different way
than Justice Sotomayor. And, as discussed below, the Court’s
conceptualization of general jurisdiction will have dramatic implications
for years to come.

197. The Daimler case itself provides a perfect illustration of this. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
assertion of jurisdiction was reasonable, while Justice Sotomayor concluded that it was not. Compare
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 925–30 (9th Cir. 2011), with Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764–65
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
198. See, e.g., Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1171–77 (9th Cir. 2006); W.
Marine, Inc. v. Watercraft Superstore, Inc., No. C11-04459 HRL, 2012 WL 479677, at *3–7 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 14, 2012); Martin v. D-Wave Sys. Int’l, Inc., No. C-09-03602 RMW, 2009 WL 4572742, *4–5 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 1, 2009); PacificCorp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Grant Cnty., Civil No. 09-1012-KI, 2009
WL 3838998, at *6–7 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2009); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d
112, 120–25 (D. Mass. 2007); Capital Equip., Inc. v. CNH Am., LLC, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1056–58 (E.D.
Ark. 2005); Coremetrics, Inc. v. Atomic Park.com, LLC, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016–25 (N.D. Cal. 2005);
World Film Servs., Inc. v. RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana S.p.A., No. 97 Civ. 8627(LMM), 1999 WL 47206,
at *3–7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999); Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1200–01 (Colo.
2005).
199. 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden is on the defendant to establish that the
assertion of jurisdiction is unreasonable. See id. at 1081. This burden makes it even more unlikely that
a court would decline to exercise general jurisdiction under the reasonableness factors, as there is
essentially a presumption in favor of exercising jurisdiction once it is found to exist.
200. Justice Sotomayor also endorses the absolute approach to general jurisdiction (coupled with a
reasonableness check) because it better accommodates access to justice for plaintiffs than the Court’s
approach. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Under the majority’s rule, for
example, a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a foreign hotel owned by a multinational
conglomerate will be unable to hold the hotel to account in a single U.S. court, even if the hotel company has
a massive presence in multiple States.”). On this point, see infra Part IV.B and, in particular, infra note 267.
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IV. The Implications of DAIMLER
The academic debates between the majority and concurrence are
fascinating, but many wonder what Daimler means for real-world
litigants. Below, I describe some of the consequences of Daimler. First,
and most importantly, Daimler signals the end of doing business
jurisdiction in the United States. Second, Daimler will put pressure on
alternative bases of jurisdiction to fill any potential voids in the
jurisdictional framework. Third, as Justice Sotomayor points out,
Daimler will have various practical consequences for litigants and courts.
A. The End of Doing Business Jurisdiction
The message in Daimler has come through loud and clear: doing
business jurisdiction is a dead letter.201 Courts are no longer to look at
whether a corporation is doing business in a state, in the sense of having
continuous and systematic general business contacts there. Rather, courts
are to look at whether a corporation has continuous and systematic
general business contacts with a state such that the corporation is fairly
regarded as being “at home” there.202 Courts must evaluate “at home”
using a comparative approach, that is, by assessing a corporation’s
contacts with the forum in relation to its contacts with other forums. “At
home” is seen as being a unique place akin to the corporation’s state of
incorporation or its principal place of business.
The Court emphasized that, outside of principal place of business
and place of incorporation, there will only be rare circumstances where a

201. See David D. Siegel, U.S. Supreme Court Severely Circumscribes “Presence” as Basis for
Personal Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations—Claim Itself Must Have Local Roots; If It Hasn’t,
Corporation’s Overall Contacts with State Won’t Support Jurisdiction, 265 Siegel’s Prac. Rev. 1, i
(2014) (noting that “a truckload of cases on personal jurisdiction goes careening into the abyss under
[Daimler]”). It is important to note that the reported case law only represents part of the picture.
Professor Twitchell states that “[g]eneral jurisdiction cases often fly below the radar, and it is difficult
to know how frequently because such cases are not reported in the case law.” Twitchell, supra note 33,
at 193. She observes that many defendants, particularly small businesses, concede the existence of
general jurisdiction because it is simply too expensive to litigate the issue. Id. at 194. Accordingly, the
Daimler decision will likely have significance beyond that which is measurable through the case law.
202. The Court engages in a sleight of hand in this respect, implying that the test for general
jurisdiction was never simply continuous and systematic general business contacts:

Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a
forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those
places paradigm all-purpose forums. Plaintiffs would have us look beyond the exemplar
bases Goodyear identified, and approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in
which a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of
business.” That formulation, we hold, is unacceptably grasping.

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–61 (citation omitted). The formulation that the Court condemns as being
“unacceptably grasping” is actually the standard that was endorsed by the Supreme Court and
prevailed in the case law for the past fifty-plus years.
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corporation will meet the “at home” test.203 The Court, in discussing
Perkins, stated:
We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, see, e.g.,
Perkins, a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal
place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home
in that State.204

At a different part of the judgment, the Court stated that the Perkins
case “should be regarded as a decision on its exceptional facts, not as a
significant reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general jurisdiction
based on nothing more than a corporation’s ‘doing business’ in a
forum.”205 Based on the tenor of the judgment, and the very nature of
the “at home” test that the Court endorses, it appears that this exception
is really a non-exception. Professor Trammell, for instance, argues that
“in the overwhelming majority of cases, there will be no occasion to
explore whether a Perkins-type exception might apply.”206 He then
answers the logical question posed by his conclusion: why, then, did the
Court not state directly that general jurisdiction is limited to a
corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of business?207
In response, Professor Trammell argues:
First, the Court in Goodyear and Daimler took pains not to overrule
any of its precedents. Perkins thus necessitates leaving the door ever so
slightly ajar. Second, the Court probably did not want to create an
ironclad rule, lest a corporation manipulate its (technical) principal
place of business in order to gain a jurisdictional advantage. In a
slightly different context, the Court recognized the need for a modicum
of flexibility in defining a corporation’s principal place of business for
that very reason.
...
The Court has left open only the slimmest possibility that general
jurisdiction might be permissible in a state that is the functional
equivalent of one of those paradigm examples. While such an
exception is theoretically possible, the Court suggests that it will be the
rarest of rarities.208

Not all scholars agree. For instance, Professors Cornett and
Hoffheimer identify five situations that could be “candidates” for
exceptional cases:
1. A foreign corporation conducting all or most of its business in
the forum State;

203. Id. at 761 n.19.
204. Id. (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 756 n.8 (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 16, at 1144) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
206. Trammell, supra note 8, at 17.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 17–18.
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2. A foreign national corporation engaging in most of its U.S.
business in one State;
3. A foreign corporation conducting all or most of its business
activity in the U.S. but maintaining no principal place of business or
place of incorporation in any state;
4. A corporation with an outsized presence in the state; and
5. Corporations maintaining a permanent physical presence in the
state by operating factories, mines, or other non-sales related
activities.209

It is not clear, however, that these are actually candidates for exceptional
cases post-Daimler. For instance, the second situation looks at whether a
foreign corporation engages in most of its U.S. business in one state.
However, if the business it does in that state is insignificant compared to
its worldwide operations, then general jurisdiction would still not be
present under Daimler. Similarly, situation number three would likely
not satisfy a Daimler exception because it focuses on the wrong issue—a
foreign corporation’s contacts with the United States as a whole. The
inquiry under Daimler is a foreign corporation’s contacts with the forum
state and whether those contacts are sufficient to render the foreign
corporation “at home” in that state. Further, numbers four and five are
similar in that they look at a significant presence (physical or otherwise)
in a state; however, if this presence is not particularly significant in
relation to the corporation’s nationwide and/or worldwide contacts, then
it too would fail the Daimler test. The only scenario that might be an
exception to Daimler would be the first, a foreign corporation
conducting all or most of its business in the forum state. However, this
may not be an exception at all; if a corporation is conducting all or most
of its business in the forum state, it would seem that that state constitutes
the corporation’s principal place of business.210 For instance, Perkins was
a case that would likely fit under the first scenario—and the Court in
Daimler essentially found that the forum in Perkins (Ohio) was the
corporation’s de facto principal place of business during the war.211
Despite Professors Cornett and Hoffheimer’s attempt to identify
scenarios that might engage the Daimler “exception,” it appears from the
209. Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 8, at 53–57.
210. This would be true at least under the “place of operations” test that is sometimes used to
determine principal place of business. See, e.g., Kimberly Nakamaru, Comment, Touching a Nerve: Hertz
v. Friend’s Impact on the Class Action Fairness Act’s Minimum Diversity Requirement, 44 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1019, 1022 (2011) (“[T]he ‘place of operations’ test locates a corporation’s principal place of business
in the state which contains a substantial predominance of corporation operations. Under the place-ofoperations test, the first step is to determine the amount of business activity in each state, and then, if the
amount of activity is ‘significantly larger’ or ‘substantially predominates’ in one state that state is the
corporation’s principal place of business. The nerve-center test places a corporation’s principal place of
business in the state containing the corporation’s headquarters.” (quoting Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a
Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500–02 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
211. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 756, 756 n.8 (2014).
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overwhelming thrust of the decision that the “exception” was really not
meant as an exception at all. Accordingly, it will be exceedingly rare for a
court to assert general jurisdiction over a corporation based on its
contacts with the forum in a state other than its principal place of
business or place of incorporation.
The end of doing business jurisdiction will undoubtedly provide
some solace to foreign defendants concerned that they might be subject
to all-purpose jurisdiction in certain (or all) U.S. states. It was thought
that asserting general jurisdiction over foreign country defendants212 was
particularly unfair for a variety of reasons. First, foreign country
defendants may not expect or foresee the possibility of general
jurisdiction based on doing business in a state.213 Second, even if they
could foresee the possibility, most foreign country defendants are not
able to predict with any degree of certainty when general jurisdiction will
be exercised. Although the problem is not unique to foreign country
defendants specifically, it is arguably more acute given foreign country
defendants’ inexperience with American jurisdictional principles.214
Third, the consequences of doing business jurisdiction are more severe
for foreign country defendants than for domestic defendants. For an
American defendant, being subject to general jurisdiction on the basis
that it is doing business somewhere means, at worst, having to defend in
an additional American state. For a foreign country defendant, it means
being subject to a “dramatically different judicial system a long distance
from home.”215
In Daimler, multiple briefs were submitted by amici advocating in
favor of a restrained test for general personal jurisdiction and against a
broad theory of jurisdictional imputation.216 For instance, the United
212. The term “foreign defendant” is generally thought to refer to a defendant from outside the
forum state (whether from another state or another country). Accordingly, the term “foreign country
defendant” is used to refer specifically to a corporate defendant from a country outside the United States.
213. See Twitchell, supra note 33, at 197.
214. See id. at 198.
215. Id.
216. Multiple amicus briefs were also submitted in favor of the plaintiffs in Daimler, arguing that
broad assertions of general jurisdiction by U.S. courts were necessary to remedy international wrongs and
were consistent with foreign jurisdictional practice. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Earthrights
International in Support of Respondents at 4, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965) (“International
practice confirms the fairness of exercising jurisdiction based upon the contacts of agent/subsidiaries
acting on the parent’s behalf. The fact that other nations, including Germany, exercise similar and
sometimes broader jurisdiction refutes any claim that jurisdiction is out of step with international practice
or that jurisdiction will chill investment in the United States or lead other nations to ‘retaliate’ against
us.”); Brief of Amici Curiae German Institute for Human Rights & Other German Legal Experts in
Support of Respondents, supra note 131, at 15 (“Daimler long ago crossed the line at which every
corporation, American or foreign, can expect to encounter the general jurisdiction of a forum with which
it has such extensive contacts. . . . When the claims in question concern crimes against humanity and
violations of internationally-recognized human rights, Daimler should not be permitted to hide from a
trial on the merits of such claims behind a fig-leaf subsidiary.” (citations omitted)).
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States filed a brief in support of the defendant, stating that “expansive
assertions of general jurisdiction over foreign corporations may operate
to the detriment of the United States’ diplomatic relations and its foreign
trade and economic interests.”217 It argued that “[f]rom an economic
perspective, the inability to predict the jurisdictional consequences of
commercial or investment activity may be a disincentive to that activity”
and that a foreign business enterprise might be unwilling or unlikely to
engage in commerce with the United States if the so-called “price of
admission” is to subject itself to general jurisdiction anywhere it is doing
business.218 Another of the amici, Viega GmbH & Co. KG and Viega
International GmbH, provided a real-life example of a foreign company
that, because it had been subject to general jurisdiction in the United
States, chose to decrease its business presence in the United States and
increase it elsewhere.219 It is clear that these arguments had an effect on
the Court in Daimler, as they appeared prominently in the last section of
the judgment.220 Thus, foreign defendants—and in particular, foreign
country defendants—can breathe a sigh of relief in the aftermath of
Daimler, secure in the knowledge that they will likely not be held to
account for wrongs in a distant and seemingly arbitrary forum.221
217. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 156, at 1.
218. Id. at 2. The amicus briefs submitted in support of Daimler all expressed similar concerns. See
generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Atlantic Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner, Daimler, 134 S.
Ct. 746 (No. 11-965); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the
National Foreign Trade Council, the Federation of German Industries, the Association of German
Chambers of Industry and Commerce, & the Organization for International Investment as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965); Brief of Economiesuisse, the
Swiss Bankers Association, ICC Switzerland, Association of German Banks, & the European Banking
Federation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965); Brief of
Amici Curiae New England Legal Foundation & Associated Industries of Massachusetts in Support of
Petitioner, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965); Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Counsel, Inc.
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965); Brief of Amica
Curiae Professor Lea Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner, supra note 111; Brief of Amici Curiae Viega
GmbH & Co. KG & Viega International GmbH in Support of Petitioner DaimlerChrysler AG,
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965). Many also noted the affront to international comity that could
arise if the United States were to continue to endorse an expansive approach to general jurisdiction.
219. Brief of Amici Curiae Viega GmbH & Co. KG & Viega International GmbH in Support of
Petitioner DaimlerChrysler AG, supra note 218, at 4 (“Bauman erroneously subjects companies like the
German Viega Companies to litigation in a forum state notwithstanding the lack of any contacts with that
forum. . . . The German Viega Companies have scaled back investment in the U.S. because of Bauman,
and those cases that have followed Bauman. Since these Bauman-influenced decisions, the German Viega
Companies have been expanding investments in other countries, such as ones in Asia, with more
predictable legal environments. Absent reversal, the German Viega Companies will consider divesting in
the United States, and will recommend to other similarly situated companies to do the same.”).
220. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
221. Twitchell notes:
Because of the heightened fairness problems present when general jurisdiction is exercised over
foreign corporations, it would seem to follow that if we are going to curtail general doing-business
jurisdiction anywhere, it should be here. And yet there is a paradox: the fairness problems may be
greater, but the needs of domestic plaintiffs also increase.
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Just as foreign defendants (particularly foreign country defendants)
are likely to be relieved by Daimler, the plaintiffs’ bar is likely to be
incensed by it. One article in the popular press indicates that the decision
has “bombshell consequences for domestic tort litigation” and could
“result in major upheavals in standard operating procedures for much of
the plaintiff’s bar.”222 The article continues, “[i]f state courts willingly
heed Daimler’s dictates, the decision’s impact on tort litigation in this
country will be immediate and dramatic. Lawyers will no longer be
permitted to seek out plaintiff-friendly forums (think Madison County,
Illinois) that bear no relation to the parties and the cause of action.”223
The author also posits that Daimler could have huge consequences for
class action litigation and “may even spell the end of nationwide class
actions against multiple defendants filed anywhere other than the states
(if any) in which all corporate defendants are at home.”224 It is unclear
what impact, if any, Daimler will have on class action litigation. It is
unlikely, however, that Daimler portends the demise of the nationwide
class action.225 At least for the time being, Daimler’s direct impact will
likely be on parties in traditional two-party litigation.
Since Daimler was decided, most courts have followed its
mandate.226 For instance, in In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany,
N.Y., Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted a writ of
mandamus instructing the Vermont district court to grant the defendant’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.227 In that case, the
plaintiff filed an action in Vermont against the defendant, Diocese of

Twitchell, supra note 33, at 199.
222. Rich Samp, With Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, High Court May Have Put Brakes on Forum
Shopping, Forbes (Feb. 4, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/02/04/with-bauman-vdaimlerchrysler-high-court-may-have-put-brakes-on-forum-shopping.
223. Id.; accord Lester Brickman, Ctr. for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Inst., Anatomy of a
Madison County (Illinois) Class Action: A Study of Pathology (2002).
224. Samp, supra note 222.
225. In an excellent article, Professor Andrews outlines four potential bases of jurisdiction over
defendants in nationwide class actions. See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem
Overlooked in the National Debate About “Class Action Fairness ,” 58 SMU L. Rev. 1313, 1349–74
(2005). One of those bases is that the defendant is doing business in the forum and therefore subject to
general jurisdiction there. Id. at 1355–60. However, she suggests that perhaps the most common basis
of jurisdiction over defendants in nationwide class actions is corporate registration, which obviously
remains untouched by Daimler. Id. at 1360–67 (“Corporate registration seems to be a commonly
assumed basis for jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. Indeed, such assumption probably
explains the lack of debate concerning jurisdiction over the defendant in nationwide class actions.”).
For a discussion of corporate registration as a basis for general jurisdiction, see infra Part IV.B.
226. See, e.g., Snodgrass v. Berklee Coll. of Music, 559 F. App’x 541 (7th Cir. 2014); In re Roman
Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc., 745 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2014); Brown v. CBS Corp., No.
3:12CV01495 AWT, 2014 WL 1924469 (D. Conn. May 14, 2014); Rocke v. Pebble Beach Co., No. 123372, 2014 WL 1725366 (E.D. Penn. Apr. 29, 2014); Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp.
2d 13 (D.D.C. 2014); see also infra note 244.
227. 745 F.3d at 33.
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Albany, alleging that he was sexually abused by a former priest.228 The
district court had accepted that Vermont had general jurisdiction over
the Diocese based primarily on the fact that “at least thirteen of the
Diocese’s approximately 200 priests conducted a combined total of
sixteen services of worship in Vermont” and that “from July 2002 to
February 2009, the Diocese authorized . . . a New York priest, to
celebrate Sunday morning mass at a Vermont church.”229 The Second
Circuit disagreed with the district court, stressing the high threshold that
now must be established under the Daimler “at home” test.230 The court
observed that the “Diocese operates no office or facility in Vermont, has
no sales in the forum, and the percentage of its contacts with Vermont
compared to its activities elsewhere (namely, New York) are trivial.”231 It
concluded that even “imputing the border parishes’ contacts with
Vermont to the Diocese (which the district court declined to do) would
not render the Diocese ‘at home’ there.”232 In fact, the Second Circuit
noted that “[t]he Diocese’s scant contacts with Vermont do not come
close” to establishing general jurisdiction under the new Daimler
standard.233
The Connecticut district court engaged in a similar analysis in
Brown v. CBS Corp.234 Brown involved a lawsuit against Lockheed
Martin, among others, stemming from injuries related to asbestos
exposure.235 The defendant was incorporated in Maryland and had its
principal place of business there.236 Nonetheless, the plaintiff sought to
establish general jurisdiction in Connecticut.237 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant was subject to general jurisdiction in Connecticut on the
basis that the defendant had continuous and systematic general business
228. Id. at 34. The Diocese is incorporated and has its principal place of business in New York. Id.
The plaintiff apparently filed the action in Vermont because the relevant statute of limitations had
expired in New York. Id. at 37.
229. Id. at 34.
230. Id. at 39.
231. Id. at 40.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 39. The court expressed concern about any contrary holding (including the holding of
the district court below):
If the Diocese is “at home” in Vermont, it begs the question: how many homes might it
have? Would the Diocese be “at home” in New Jersey if one of its hundreds of priests were
to conduct a wedding or two in that State over a matter of years? Would circulation of The
Evangelist to a Wyoming resident render the Diocese “at home” there? It is difficult to see
where jurisdiction would end; foreign-state and foreign-country corporations could be found
“at home” essentially anywhere, based on the briefest and most trivial of contacts. The
Supreme Court explicitly rejected such an expansion of general jurisdiction in Daimler AG.

Id. at 40–41.
234.
235.
236.
237.

No. 3:12CV01495 AWT, 2014 WL 1924469 (D. Conn. May 14, 2014).
Id. at *1.

Id.
Id. at *6.
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contacts there.238 The district court rejected this basis for jurisdiction,
stating that “[a]lthough Lockheed’s contacts with Connecticut may
appear substantial, when viewed in relation to its operations as a whole,
Lockheed’s Connecticut activities account for a relatively trivial amount
of its overall business.”239 The court accepted the plaintiff’s descriptions
of the contacts between the defendant and Connecticut240 but concluded
that “in every respect, these contacts are less extensive than those found
by the Supreme Court to be insufficient to establish general jurisdiction
in Daimler.”241 For example, the court observed that the defendant’s
Connecticut-based revenue accounted for a mere 0.1%of its national
revenue, a much smaller percentage than the 2.4%of worldwide sales in
Daimler.242 The court concluded that “[i]f Daimler cannot fairly be said
to be ‘at home’ in California, Lockheed is definitively not ‘at home’ in
Connecticut.”243
It is clear that the courts in In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany
and Brown fully appreciated the consequences of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daimler.244 However, as is to be expected, the contraction of
238. Id. at *6–7. The plaintiff also relied on a consent theory of jurisdiction, arguing that “by
registering to do business in Connecticut and designating the Secretary of the State as its agent for
process [under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-929], Lockheed consented to be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of Connecticut courts.” Id. at *3. The court concluded that irrespective of the
corporation’s registration to do business, “the requirements of the due process clause must also be
met.” Id. at *4. In other words, the corporation’s act of registering to do business might address
consent to service of process but not consent to personal jurisdiction. For additional discussion on
consent as a basis for general jurisdiction, see infra Part IV.B.
239. Brown, 2014 WL 1924469, at *6.
240. Id. at *7 (“Lockheed Martin currently has 28 employees working in four separate cities, it
leases property in New London with its name on the building and a telephone listing, it has derived
about $160 million in revenue from Connecticut since 2008, and it pays corporate income tax in
Connecticut.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court noted, however:
[T]hese contacts represent only a small portion of Lockheed’s overall business in the United
States. The figures cited by the plaintiff represent “less than five one-hundredths of one
percent of Lockheed Martin’s employees” nationwide, and “less than five one-hundredths
of one percent to just over one tenth of one percent of Lockheed Martin’s total revenue”
for any particular year. Furthermore, while Lockheed does lease and operate out of one
9,000 square foot space in Connecticut, and has leased other properties in the past, it owns
no real property in the state. Finally, although Lockheed may have “relationships with
Connecticut business” and “pay[] state income taxes and carry[] workers’ compensation
insurance,” its operations and services are directed primarily toward the United States
government, not Connecticut businesses and residents.

Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
241. Id. at *8.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Note that In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany and Brown provide a much more fulsome
analysis of general jurisdiction than most of the cases post-Daimler. In the majority of cases postDaimler, the general jurisdiction inquiry is disposed of in a very cursory and conclusory manner. See,
e.g., Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 224–26 (2d Cir. 2014); Associated
Energy Grp., LLC v. Air Cargo Ger. GMBH, No. 4:13-CV-2019, 2014 WL 2534909, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex.
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general jurisdiction might work an injustice (or what appears to be an
injustice) in certain cases. Justice Sotomayor recognized this in her
concurrence, when she predicted that the ultimate effect of the Court’s
decision would be to shift the risk of loss from large corporations to the
individuals that those corporations have harmed.245 She provides an
example of “a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a
foreign hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate” and notes that
under the Court’s approach, the parents would be “unable to hold the
hotel to account in a single U.S. court, even if the hotel company has a
massive presence in multiple States.”246
Justice Sotomayor’s observations have proved to be prescient. Just a
few weeks after Daimler was decided, the Southern District of Florida
issued a decision dealing with the issue of whether a Florida court could
assert general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that managed the
property where the American plaintiff was injured.247 In Barriere v.
June 4, 2014); JWQ Cabinetry, Inc. v. Granada Wood & Cabinets, Inc., No. 13-4110 (FLW), 2014 WL
2050267, at *3 (D.N.J. May 19, 2014); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-cv-05395 (JLL) (JAD), 2014
WL 1669873, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014); Google Inc. v. Rockstar Consortium U.S. LP, No. C 13-5933
CW, 2014 WL 1571807, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014); Am. Recreation Prods., LLC v. Tennier
Indus., Inc., No. 4:13CV421 CDP, 2014 WL 1315182, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2014); Air Tropiques,
Sprl v. N. & W. Ins. Co. Ltd., No. H-13-1438, 2014 WL 1323046, at *10–11 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014);
Lexion Med., LLC v. SurgiQuest, Inc., No. 13-2453 (RHK/FLN), 2014 WL 1260761, at *3–4 (D. Minn.
Mar. 26, 2014); M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Inc., No. 13-2385 ADM/JJG, 2014 WL
494680, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2014), order withdrawn, 2014 WL 991129 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2014);
Beach v. Citigroup Alt. Invs. LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7717(PKC), 2014 WL 904650, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2014); Hertges v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 13-2699 (RHK/JJG), 2014 WL 346030, at *2 (D.
Minn. Jan. 30, 2014); Smart Trike, MNF, PTE, Ltd. v. Piermont Prods. LLC, No. 650376/2012, 2014
WL 2042298, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 16, 2014). Even in the cases that engage in a more detailed
analysis, the comparative component is often absent from the inquiry. See, e.g., Cutcher v. Midland
Funding, LLC, No. ELH-13-3733, 2014 WL 2109916, at *6–8 (D. Md. May 19, 2014); Meyer v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., No. 13 Civ.3128(CM), 2014 WL 2039654, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014);
Simon v. Republic of Hung., No. 10-1770 (BAH), 2014 WL 1873411, at *32–39 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014);
Price v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. ELH-13-02535, 2014 WL 1764722, at *8–9 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2014);
Rates Tech. Inc. v. Cequel Commc’ns, LLC, No. 13 Civ. 0011 (ALC) (FM), 2014 WL 1494337, at *4–6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2014). This is likely because Daimler was so clear in restricting general jurisdiction
that there is not really a need to engage in a robust jurisdictional analysis. In all but the most difficult
cases, it will be plain that a corporate defendant outside its state of incorporation or principal place of
business is not “at home” there.
245. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
246. Id. The argument was also advanced by the amicus, American Association for Justice. Brief
for the Amicus Curiae American Association for Justice in Support of Respondents at 5, Daimler, 134
S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965) (“If petitioner’s view prevails, non-US corporations can avoid being sued in
this country by doing all their business through a wholly-owned subsidiary, an arrangement over which
they have total control and over which those whom they injure have no input or even knowledge. To
allow such wholesale avoidance of personal jurisdiction would undermine the minimum contacts test
as it has evolved since International Shoe and result in great unfairness to injured persons and a
significant reduction in corporate accountability.” (citation omitted)).
247. See Barriere v. Juluca, No. 12-23510, 2014 WL 652831, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014).
(“Allegedly, Plaintiff Aimee Barriere slipped and fell on wet tiles as she was descending stairs on her
way to the beach and suffered serious injury.”).
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Juluca, the defendant corporation was incorporated in Anguilla and had

its principal place of business there. The accident giving rise to the
litigation occurred at the defendant’s resort property in Anguilla.
Although the plaintiff was domiciled in Texas, she sued in Florida where
she argued that the defendant was subject to general jurisdiction.248 The
Florida court accepted the plaintiff’s characterization of the factual
connections between Florida and the Anguillan defendant:249 (1) the
defendant maintains a sales office in Miami; (2) the defendant’s assets
are managed by Florida-based consultants; and (3) co-defendants in the
action promote, manage, operate, and provide reservation services for
resorts, including the defendant; provide extensive sales and promotional
support; set forth the standards required to maintain association with the
co-defendants’ group; and regularly inspect the defendant’s premises in
Anguilla.250 The court noted that “[t]hese allegations . . . are sufficient for
this court to find that [defendant] Cap Juluca has such minimum contacts
with Florida to be considered ‘at home.’”251 The Florida court recognized
that “Daimler has undoubtedly limited the application of general
jurisdiction to foreign defendants,” but did not read the case as
mandating that Florida courts cast aside their previous precedents.252 The

248. Id.
249. These connections are attenuated for general jurisdiction even under the pre-Daimler standard.
In effect, the only direct connection between the defendant and Florida was that it had a sales office
there. The other connections identified by the court are indirect—it hired Florida-based consultants to
manage its assets and certain co-defendants in the case do business in Florida. See id. at *5, *8.
250. Id. at *8 (“Plaintiffs have alleged that Leading Hotels of the World is the actual or apparent
agent of Cap Juluca and that Cap Juluca maintained control over Leading Hotels of the World, or
alternatively, that Leading Hotels of the World maintained control over Cap Juluca.”).
251. Id.
252. Id. at *9. The court selectively quoted from Daimler in an effort to bolster its questionable
conclusions. It stated:
What is clear from Daimler is that, for a court to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation, that corporation must be “at home” in the forum. “At home” can be read to
mean “instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities.” While the Court did not expand on the specifics, it
noted that it would be possible for a corporation to be “at home” in places outside of its
place of incorporation or principal place of business.

Id. at *7 (citations omitted) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014)). Two things
are misleading about this passage. First, the court’s statement that “at home” means “instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to
justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities ” is
inaccurate. Id. (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761) (internal quotation marks omitted). The quoted
passage is simply a statement of what it means for a court to have general jurisdiction, not what “at
home” means. According to the Supreme Court, “at home” is intended to mean “comparable to a
domestic enterprise in that State.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n.11. Second, the court in Barriere noted
that it “would be possible for a corporation to be ‘at home’ in places outside of its place of
incorporation or principal place of business.” Barriere, 2014 WL 652831, at *7. What it failed to
mention is that that the Court indicated that it would “not foreclose the possibility that in an
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court failed to grapple with the implications of the Daimler Court’s “at
home” language and its admonition that the “at home” basis for
jurisdiction would be “exceptional.”253 Instead, the court based its
decision on the adverse policy consequences of not assuming jurisdiction,
stating that “[a] contrary result would effectively permit foreign
corporations to freely solicit and accept business from Americans in the
United States and at the same time be completely shielded from any
liability in U.S. courts from any injury that may arise as a result.”254 It is
clear that the court assumed general jurisdiction over the Anguillan
defendant, not because it was truly “at home” in Florida, but because the
failure to do so would leave American plaintiffs without an effective
remedy.255 As laudable a goal it is to provide redress in the United States
for injuries sustained abroad, the result simply cannot be squared with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler. It will likely be in cases like
these—where the consequences of not assuming jurisdiction appear
unfair—that will prove the most fertile testing ground for Daimler’s
holding.
B. Additional Pressure on Alternative Bases of Jurisdiction
In light of Daimler, one should expect plaintiffs’ counsel (as well as
courts) to find creative ways around the decision.256 The Barriere case,
discussed above, presents one way that courts will attempt to circumvent
the decision: by reading the decision selectively and in a way that does
not comport with the underlying thrust of the case. More than likely,
however, courts will heed the guidance of Daimler and restrict general
jurisdiction to circumstances where the defendant is truly “at home.”

exceptional case” a corporation could be subject to general jurisdiction in a place other than its state
or incorporation or principal place of business. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19 (emphasis added). The
court in Barriere did not give any credence to the Court’s statements about the exceptionality of
general jurisdiction outside of the paradigm cases.
253. The court in Barriere also ignored the Supreme Court’s statement that a reasonableness
check is superfluous for general jurisdiction and proceeded to analyze why the assertion of jurisdiction
over the Anguillan defendant was, in fact, reasonable on the facts of the case. Barriere, 2014 WL
652831, at *8–9. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
254. Barriere, 2014 WL 652831, at *8. See also id. at *9 (noting that ignoring previous precedents
because of Daimler “would effectively deprive American citizens from litigating in the United States
for virtually all injuries that occur at foreign resorts maintained by foreign defendants even where, as
here, the corporations themselves maintain an American sales office in Florida and heavily market in
the jurisdiction”).
255. Professor Childress also identifies Barriere as a case where a lower court found general
jurisdiction in a situation “beyond what the Court . . . intended in its Goodyear and Bauman
decisions.” Childress, After Bauman, supra note 8, at 202. He correctly notes that the “reason for this
is that the jargon of personal jurisdiction obscures what is really at stake in individual cases: the
competing demands of access to justice for plaintiffs and fairness for defendants.” Id.
256. See Siegel, supra note 201, at 2 (“The opportunities for personal jurisdiction of [sic] foreign
corporations are of course much reduced after Daimler, but not gone entirely.”).
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This is already evidenced in the case law that has been decided since
Daimler was released earlier this year.257
With that said, one can envision at least three arguments that
plaintiffs who are unable to establish general jurisdiction under Daimler
might advance in an attempt to establish personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.258 First, a plaintiff might argue that the case involves specific
jurisdiction and that the cause of action “arises out of” or “relates to” the
defendant’s contacts with the forum. Had the plaintiffs in Barriere, for
instance, been domiciled in Florida rather than Texas, this could have
been a plausible approach to establishing jurisdiction, notwithstanding
the decision in Daimler. The argument would have been as follows:
plaintiff’s decision to take a vacation at the defendant’s hotel in Anguilla
arose, at least in part, from the defendant’s extensive marketing and
promotional efforts in Florida. In this respect, the underlying cause of
action could be said to “arise out of” or “relate to” the defendant’s
conduct in the forum.
This logic was used in Nowak v. Tak How Investment Ltd., where
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that there was specific
jurisdiction over a Hong Kong hotel concerning a death at the hotel’s
pool.259 In Nowak, the court noted that there was a “meaningful link”
between the hotel’s contact with the forum, Massachusetts, and the harm
suffered:
“The Hotel’s solicitation of Kiddie’s business and the extensive backand-forth resulting in Burke’s reserving a set of rooms for Kiddie
employees and their spouses set in motion a chain of reasonably
foreseeable events resulting in Mrs. Nowak’s death. The possibility that
the solicitation would prove successful and that one or more of the
guests staying at the Hotel as a result would use the pool was in no
sense remote or unpredictable; in fact, the Hotel included the pool as
an attraction in its promotional materials.”260

The court further noted that “[i]f [a] resident is harmed while engaged in
activities integral to the relationship the corporation sought to establish,
we think the nexus between the contacts and the cause of action is
257. See supra pp. 271–73.
258. Rhodes and Robertson argue that the Daimler decision may also put pressure on pendant
jurisdiction to fill any holes in the jurisdictional scheme. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 8, at 35–44.
They posit that:
After Bauman, the constitutional case for allowing the exercise of pendent personal
jurisdiction becomes even stronger. . . . The ability to hear these intertwined claims becomes
especially important once the scope of general jurisdiction is reduced. Without the
availability of pendent personal jurisdiction as a safety valve, limiting general jurisdiction
means limiting the number of fora that could hear the case as a whole—and therefore
potentially requiring that different courts hear different claims within a larger case.

Id. at 41–42.
259. 94 F.3d 708, 711, 719 (1st Cir. 1996).
260. Id. at 716 (quoting Nowak v. Tak How Inv. Ltd., 899 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D. Mass. 1995)).
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sufficiently strong to survive the due process inquiry at least at the
relatedness stage.”261 Accordingly, the court was of the view that the
cause of action in Nowak arose from the transaction of business by the
defendant in the forum.262 In the aftermath of Daimler, one should
expect plaintiffs in these sorts of cases to cast their analysis of jurisdiction
as involving questions of specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.
This will, in turn, require courts to explore the outer parameters of the
“arises out of” or “relates to” aspect of specific jurisdiction.263
Second, a plaintiff might attempt to make an argument for courts to
accept jurisdiction on the basis that they are a “forum of necessity” or a
“forum of last resort.”264 This doctrine has largely been rejected in
American law, but it is gaining some traction internationally.265 Under
the doctrine, courts would enjoy a residual discretion to assume

261. Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715–16.
262. Id. at 712 (“To satisfy the requirements of the long-arm statute, Section 3(a), the defendant
must have transacted business in Massachusetts and the plaintiffs’ claim must have arisen from the
transaction of business by the defendant.”).
263. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 427 (1984) (“[A] court’s
specific jurisdiction should be applicable whenever the cause of action arises out of or relates to the
contacts between the defendant and the forum.”); see also Andrews, supra note 16, at 1026 (“In
International Shoe, the Court used several different terms to describe relationship and lack of
relationship: activities that ‘give rise to’ liabilities, as opposed to activities that are ‘unconnected,’
‘unrelated,’ or ‘entirely distinct’ from the claims. Since then, the Court has not defined the necessary
degree of relationship . . . .”); Brilmayer et al., supra note 11, at 736–38 (“While it has acknowledged
the importance of the relation of the claim to the forum, the Court’s opinions fail to describe exactly
what type of relatedness between the claim and the forum is necessary in order to establish specific
jurisdiction. . . . Just what courts mean when they speak of this amorphous concept of relatedness,
however, is simply unclear.”).
264. Professor Twitchell argued in her article, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing Business
Jurisdiction, that doing business jurisdiction sometimes provided a forum of necessity where there was
no other basis of jurisdiction over a defendant. Twitchell, supra note 33, at 195–96 (“Finally, we use
doing-business jurisdiction . . . to fill in holes in our jurisdictional scheme. By providing an additional
forum for the plaintiff, we may be engaging in some indirect economic equalization unattainable
through more straightforward means; occasionally, doing-business jurisdiction may provide a forum by
necessity where multiple defendants are involved.”). Given that Daimler has drastically circumscribed
the ambit of general jurisdiction, courts may feel the need to develop an independent forum of
necessity doctrine to fill any residual gaps.
265. See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Changes in the European Union’s Regime of Recognizing
and Enforcing Foreign Judgments and Transnational Litigation in the United States , 18 Sw. J. Int’l
Law 567, 589 n.109 (2012) (“In the U.S., the Supreme Court has twice refused to consider adoption of
a forum of necessity on the facts before it when the minimum contacts required by the due process
clause were otherwise missing.” (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 419 n.13; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 211 n.37 (1977))); see also Peter Hay et al., Conflict of Laws § 6.6, at 402 (5th ed. 2010) (“The
boundaries of this necessity doctrine, and whether it really exists, are the subject of some considerable
debate.”); Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access , 93 B.U.
L. Rev. 2033, 2051 (2013) (“In the United States, the doctrine’s status is debated. If it exists at all, it
would seem to exist as a factor for courts to weigh at the reasonableness stage of the jurisdictional due
process inquiry, with the lack of an available alternative forum favoring jurisdiction. In other
jurisdictions, the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity is recognized and, when applicable, it authorizes
(but does not require) a court to assert jurisdiction.”).
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jurisdiction in circumstances where there is no other forum in which the
plaintiff can reasonably seek relief. In other words, the forum of
necessity doctrine accepts that there will be exceptional cases where the
jurisdictional test is not satisfied, but that concerns for access to justice
nonetheless justify the assumption of jurisdiction.266 Consider, for
instance, the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this Article: a
plaintiff who slips and falls at a Home Depot store in Florida but later
moves to, and sues in, Texas. Depending on the circumstances, this
scenario might be a prime candidate for the forum of necessity doctrine.
If, for instance, the plaintiff was unable to physically travel to Florida and
could not afford the expense of litigating out of state, these might
provide sufficiently compelling circumstances to justify the invocation of
the forum of necessity doctrine.267
Courts in Canada appear to have accepted the forum of necessity
doctrine.268 In Van Breda v. Club Resorts Ltd., the seminal case on
personal jurisdiction in Canada, the Supreme Court refrained from
deciding the issue of whether forum of necessity was a part of Canadian
law.269 However, the Ontario Court of Appeal in that case had endorsed
a forum of necessity doctrine, and lower courts in Canada have accepted
its applicability in the appropriate cases.270 The doctrine is also accepted

266. Professor Whytock describes the doctrine as follows:
[U]nder the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity (forum necessitatis), “a court has
exceptional jurisdiction if justice so demands, even absent the usual requirements, because
no other forum is available to the plaintiff.” The doctrine not only operates to provide court
access that might not otherwise be available, but also is sometimes justified as permitted, or
even required, by a legal right to court access or the international law prohibition of denial
of justice.
Whytock, supra note 265, at 2050 (quoting Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 Mich. J.
Int’l L. 1003, 1053–54 (2006)).
267. Arguably, the forum of necessity doctrine would be preferable to Justice Sotomayor’s
reasonableness check on general jurisdiction in ensuring access to justice for plaintiffs. Justice
Sotomayor’s reasonableness check presupposes that the forum has continuous and systematic general
business contacts with the forum (as assessed, according to her, in absolute terms). In cases where the
prospective defendant lacks these continuous and systematic contacts, the plaintiff is simply out of luck.
For instance, if the hypothetical Home Depot plaintiff slipped and fell at a purely local Florida hardware
store, she would not be able to sue in Texas, irrespective of how difficult (or impossible) it would be for
her to travel back to Florida and litigate there. The forum of necessity doctrine, on the other hand, may
permit a plaintiff who is truly unable to sue in the most appropriate forum to sue elsewhere.
268. For a discussion of the forum of necessity doctrine in Canada, see generally Janet Walker,
Muscutt Misplaced: The Future of Forum Necessity Jurisdiction in Canada, 48 Can. Bus. L.J. 135 (2009).
269. [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, paras. 59, 82, 86, 100 (Can. S.C.C.).
270. See Van Breda v. Village Resorts, Ltd. (2010), 98 O.R. 3d 721, para. 100 (Can. Ont. C.A.);
Bouzari v. Bahremani, [2011] O.J. No. 5009 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Elfarnawani v. Int’l Olympic
Comm., 2011 ONSC 6784, paras. 61–70 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Jafarzadehahmadsargoorabi v. Sabet,
2011 ONSC 5827, para. 73 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Van Kessel v. Orsulak, 2010 ONSC 6919, paras. 45–
53 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); see also W. Van Inc. v. Daisley, 2014 ONCA 232, paras. 1, 15–43 (Can. Ont.
C.A.) (noting that the issue in the case was “whether the court should exercise its residual discretion to
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in countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland,
Portugal, and Switzerland.271 One U.S. commentator observes that “[i]n
theory, there is no reason why forum of necessity couldn’t be adopted by
U.S. courts or legislatures.”272 However, the major conceptual problem
with forum of necessity is that the doctrine applies when a court
otherwise does not possess personal jurisdiction over a defendant. How
can the assertion of jurisdiction in these circumstances comport with due
process?273 This will be the central question to be answered in any
attempt to invoke the doctrine of forum of necessity in U.S. law.
Perhaps the most plausible route to establishing jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant who is not otherwise “at home” in the forum will be to
look to whether it has registered to do business in the forum and then to
use that registration as an independent basis for jurisdiction over the
defendant.274 Every state has a corporate registration statute that
requires a corporation that is doing business in the state to register with
the state, pay a fee, and appoint an agent for service of process.275 Courts
are divided on the jurisdictional consequences associated with registering
to do business in a state. Some courts hold that the act of registering to
do business and appointing an agent in a state is simply a way of
effectuating service of process in cases where the state otherwise has
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.276 Other courts have found that
registering to do business pursuant to a state statute confers specific

assume jurisdiction based on the common law forum of necessity exception to the real and substantial
connection test recognized by this court in Van Breda v. Village Resorts Ltd.”).
271. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A
Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 127, 135 (2013).
272. Id. at 136.
273. But see Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 7 (2006) (arguing that “nonresident, alien
defendants do not have due process rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments
and . . . contrary to conventional wisdom, sovereignty principles are what limit a court’s jurisdiction”).
274. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 8, at 51 (“Given the constriction of general jurisdiction
in Bauman, the natural next step for plaintiffs is to seek other grounds for general jurisdiction—and
the most obvious place to look for such consent is in a state registration filing that designates a
corporate agent for service of process.”).
275. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1301(a) (McKinney 2003) (“A foreign corporation shall not
do business in this state until it has been authorized to do so as provided in this article. A foreign
corporation may be authorized to do in this state any business which may be done lawfully in this state
by a domestic corporation, to the extent that it is authorized to do such business in the jurisdiction of
its incorporation, but no other business.”); id. § 305(a) (“[E]very . . . authorized foreign corporation
may designate a registered agent in this state upon whom process against such a corporation may be
served.”).
276. See, e.g., Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“Whether jurisdiction in the sense of due process exists depends upon concepts of ‘fairness’ and
‘convenience’ and not upon mere compliance with procedural requirements of notice, nor even corporate
‘presence’ within this state. . . . A registered agent, from any conceivable perspective, hardly amounts to
‘the general business presence’ of a corporation so as to sustain an assertion of general jurisdiction.”); see
also In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1277 (D. Md. 1981).
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jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to the business that is
actually being conducted in that state.277 Yet other courts hold that the
mere act of registering to do business in a state subjects a corporation to
general jurisdiction there, such that the corporation can be sued in that
state with respect to any and all claims, including those without any
connection to the state.278 Those courts holding that corporate
registration confers general jurisdiction over a defendant usually rely on
the notion of consent.279 That is, by taking proactive steps to register
under a state statute and appoint an agent for service of process, a
corporation has knowingly and voluntarily consented to general
jurisdiction in the courts of that state. Since consent is an independent
basis for jurisdiction, separate and apart from minimum contacts, it does
not run afoul of due process to assert jurisdiction over a corporation
based on the corporation registering to do business in a state.280
A surprising number of states adhere to this latter view of corporate
registration.281 New York, for example, is one of those states that regards
registering to do business as conferring general jurisdiction over a
corporation.282 In Rockefeller University v. Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc.,

277. See, e.g., Gray Lines Tours v. Reynolds Elec. & Eng’g Co., 238 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987) (“Thus far the highest court in California has given to this legislation no construction
which authorizes service of process upon the statutory agent of the foreign corporation defendant
where the suit is found upon a cause of action in no way connected with business transacted within this
state. In the absence of any such interpretation, the decisions . . . rendered by the highest court in the
land require in this instance that the California law authorizing service of process upon a foreign
corporation doing business within the state be construed so as to exclude from the operation thereof
suits founded upon causes of action not arising in the business done by such foreign corporation in this
state.” (citations omitted) (quoting Miner v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 16 F. Supp. 930, 931 (S.
D. Cal. 1936)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
278. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990)
(“[A]ppointment of an agent for service of process . . . gives consent to the jurisdiction of the
Minnesota courts for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities within the state. Such
consent is a valid basis of personal jurisdiction, and resort to minimum-contacts or due-process
analysis to justify the jurisdiction is unnecessary.”); see also Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d
Cir. 1991).
279. See Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1199 (“A defendant may voluntarily consent or submit to the
jurisdiction of a court which otherwise would not have jurisdiction over it. One of the most solidly
established ways of giving such consent is to designate an agent for service of process within the
State.” (citation omitted)).
280. See Rockefeller Univ. v. Ligand Pharm. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 461, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Because jurisdiction is premised upon consent, it is doubtful that the minimum contacts test under
the due process clause presents an impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction.”); see also Andrews,
supra note 16, at 1073 (“Under Bauxites, consent is a proper basis for jurisdiction, independent of
International Shoe minimum contacts analysis.”).
281. See, e.g., Bohreer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 165 P.3d 186, 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Sternberg v.
O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1116 (Del. 1988); Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 170 (Kan. 2006);
Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Minn. 1991); Werner v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 272 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
282. See Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 438 (1916); Augsbury Corp.
v. Petrokey Corp., 97 A.D.2d 173, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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the Southern District of New York stated that “[i]n maintaining an active
authorization to do business and not taking steps to surrender it as it has
a right to do, defendant was on constructive notice that New York deems
an authorization to do business as consent to jurisdiction.”283 The court
further stated that “[t]he continuing existence of the privilege to do
business in New York, regardless of whether it is exercised, rightfully
yields jurisdictional consequences if the consent to service on the
Secretary of State goes unrevoked.”284 One would imagine that many
thousands of businesses are registered to do business under the New
York statute. Therefore, even where a corporation is not “at home” in
New York, in the Daimler sense of the term, it nonetheless will be
subject to general jurisdiction there if it has registered pursuant to the
New York registration statute.
It is likely in the post-Daimler era that more cases will be predicated
on the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction via its registration under the
relevant state statute. Many courts that have not yet had occasion to
address the jurisdictional consequences of state registration statutes will
likely have occasion to do so in the near future. Since plaintiffs are going
to have very limited success in arguing that a foreign corporation is “at
home” in a state other than its state of incorporation or principal place of
business, registration provides one potential avenue for asserting
jurisdiction over otherwise unattainable foreign corporations. Of course,
this does not apply in cases where the corporation has not registered to
do business in any state.285
Courts and commentators have debated the constitutionality of
registration as a basis for general jurisdiction.286 Many are concerned that
subjecting a corporation to general jurisdiction on the basis of its
registration to do business in a state is incompatible with due process.287
In the words of one Texas court:

283. 581 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
284. Id. at 467 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 cmt. C301:6 (McKinney 2001)).
285. For instance, in the Barriere case, this option would not be open unless the defendant
registered to do business somewhere in the United States.
286. See generally Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting
Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 Rev. Litig. 1 (1990); Tanya J. Monestier,
Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, Cardozo L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2015); Pierre Riou, Note, General Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: All That
Glitters is Not Gold Issue Mining, 14 Rev. Litig. 741 (1995); Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration
Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1163 (2003).
287. See Kipp, supra note 286, at 17 n.71 (“One may wonder . . . why, if it is the Due Process
Clause . . . which denied the power of the state to imply consent to suit on claims arising out of
transactions occurring elsewhere than within the state, it did not also deny to the state the power to
extort such a consent in writing.”); Taylor, supra note 286, at 1168 (“[T]he assertion of general
jurisdiction through registration, arguably among the most egregious assertions of jurisdiction, has
slipped through a tear in the fabric of due process protection.”).
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The idea that a foreign corporation consents to jurisdiction in Texas by
completing a state-required form, without having contact with Texas, is
entirely fictional. Due process is central to consent; it is not waived
lightly. A waiver through consent must be willful, thoughtful, and fair.
“Extorted actual consent” and “equally unwilling implied consent” are
not the stuff of due process.288

Though the Supreme Court endorsed registration as a basis for
general jurisdiction nearly 100 years ago in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance
Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.,289 this was well
before International Shoe and the development of more contemporary
understandings of due process. In fact, during oral argument in
Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg telegraphed concern about registration as a
basis for general jurisdiction.290 Although there will be increased
pressure on registration to do business to fill the gaps left open by
Daimler, it too is a basis for jurisdiction that is ripe for revisiting.
C. Practical Consequences for Litigants and Courts
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor outlines some practical
consequences for litigants and courts stemming from the Court’s decision
in Daimler. First, she points out that one can expect additional
jurisdictional discovery as a result of Daimler.291 She notes that “[r]ather
than ascertaining the extent of a corporate defendant’s forum-state
contacts alone, courts will now have to identify the extent of a company’s
contacts in every other forum where it does business in order to compare
them against the company’s in-state contacts.”292 The Court does not
adequately respond to this critique, other than to say that “it is hard to
see why much in the way of discovery would be needed to determine
where a corporation is at home.”293 Justice Sotomayor is likely correct
that the effect of the Court’s decision is to increase jurisdictional
discovery. A plaintiff seeking to establish that a corporation is “at home”
in a certain state will need information concerning not only the
corporation’s activities within the state, but also its activities outside the
state. With that said, much of this information was likely provided as part
of discovery anyway, as attested to by the fact that the Daimler record
contained information on not only Daimler’s connections with

288. Leonard v. USA Petrol. Corp., 829 F. Supp. 882, 889 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
289. 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
290. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/10-76.pdf.
291. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 770–71 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
292. Id. at 771 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 762 n.20. Justice Ginsburg, in turn, uses this as an opportunity to say that Justice
Sotomayor’s reasonableness check on jurisdiction would “indeed compound the jurisdictional
inquiry.” Id.
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California, but how those connections were insignificant compared with
its connections elsewhere.294 A corporation will likely be all too happy to
provide a plaintiff with information about its national or international
activities in an effort to defeat jurisdiction.
Second, Justice Sotomayor points out that the Court’s approach
“will treat small businesses unfairly in comparison to national and
multinational conglomerates.”295 She posits that “[w]hereas a larger
company will often be immunized from general jurisdiction in a State on
account of its extensive contacts outside the forum, a small business will
not be.”296 Justice Sotomayor is correct that, jurisdictionally speaking,
large businesses may fare better than small businesses. For instance,
Home Depot, a large multinational corporation with almost two
thousand locations across the United States,297 will likely only be
considered “at home” in two places—its state of incorporation
(Delaware) and its principal place of business (Georgia). By contrast,
Benny’s, a New England home improvement store with stores in Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, could conceivably be deemed
“at home” in each of these three states.298 It is likely that the forty-two
Home Depot locations in Massachusetts299 generate much more revenue
than the twelve Benny’s stores in Massachusetts.300 However, under
Daimler, Home Depot will not be subject to general jurisdiction in
Massachusetts, while Benny’s may be.301 Would this be treating Benny’s
unfairly vis-à-vis Home Depot? Maybe. But maybe that is simply the
price to pay for reining in general jurisdiction while retaining the
flexibility to find general jurisdiction in states other than the state of
incorporation or principal place of business.
Third, Justice Sotomayor observes that the practical effect of
Daimler is to shift the risk of loss from multinational corporations to the
individuals harmed by their actions.302 Thus, litigants who otherwise
could have sued a defendant in a forum because the defendant was doing
business there will now be restricted in where they can sue—and in some
294. See id. at 752 (“MBUSA’s California sales account for 2.4%of Daimler’s worldwide sales.”).
295. Id. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
296. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
297. Stores, Products, and Services, Home Depot, https://corporate.homedepot.com/OurCompany/
StoreProdServices/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
298. See Benny’s, Inc., Find the Best Company, http://companies.findthebest.com/l/977685/Bennys-Inc-in-Smithfield-RI (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). Benny’s is incorporated in Rhode Island and has its
principal place of business in Rhode Island. Id.
299. The Home Depot, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Mar. 27, 2014).
300. See All Benny’s Locations, My Store 411, http://www.mystore411.com/store/listing/1224/Benny’sstore-locations (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
301. Given the narrowness of the Daimler exception, it is not clear that Benny’s would actually be
subject to general jurisdiction in Massachusetts or Connecticut. The point, however, is that as between
the two companies, Benny’s is far more likely than Home Depot to meet the “at home” test.
302. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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cases, will not be able to sue in the United States altogether. Justice
Sotomayor’s position assumes that plaintiffs are not willing (or able) to
sue in a foreign forum. Simply because American plaintiffs may not get
redress in the United States does not necessarily mean that they will not
get redress period.303 American courts should be careful not to assume
that only the United States can “hold [a defendant] to account” for
tortious conduct.304 While there will undoubtedly be sympathetic
situations where courts want to provide a forum for redress for injured
American plaintiffs, such as in the Barriere case,305 that motivation
cannot be the sole guiding force behind the adoption of an appropriate
test for general jurisdiction.
Fourth, Justice Sotomayor points out that the Court’s approach in
Daimler:
creates the incongruous result that an individual defendant whose only
contact with a forum State is a one-time visit will be subject to general
jurisdiction if served with process during that visit, but a large
corporation that owns property, employs workers, and does billions of
dollars’ worth of business in the State will not be, simply because the
corporation has similar contacts elsewhere. 306

Justice Sotomayor is correct that there is a perceived disconnect between
rules that allow for the assertion of general jurisdiction over individuals
based upon the simple act of serving an individual with process, and not
allowing general jurisdiction over corporations that have significant and
enduring contacts with the forum. Others have also noted this disconnect
and advocated for revisiting the oft-maligned rule that presence in the
jurisdiction when served with process is a legitimate basis for general
jurisdiction over individuals.307

303. See Stein, supra note 164, at 542 (“[I]t doesn’t really bother me that the plaintiffs in Goodyear
Dunlop were forced to pursue their remedies for the injuries suffered in France in a French court. And
I don’t think I would have been any more troubled had the defendants conducted significantly greater
activities in the forum. Not everyone gets to sue at home.”).
304. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Accord Childress, Transnational Law
Market, supra note 8, at 79 (“[O]ne should not lose sight of the plaintiff’s need for justice in the
individual case. Yet, we should not be so bold as to assume that justice in the United States is the only
justice that should count. Unless it can be shown that no other forum would grant the plaintiffs access
to justice, U.S. courts should resist creative assertions of general jurisdiction.”).
305. Barriere v. Juluca, No. 12-23510, 2014 WL 652831 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014); see, e.g., Meier v.
Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002).
306. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
307. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); see also Stein, supra note 164, at 549
(“All of the reasons that support limiting general jurisdiction to a corporate defendant’s home base
apply with even greater force to individual defendants. . . . Although I do not expect the Court to
reverse course, I hope the Court will move off of its position that jurisdiction over persons is justified
by raw territorial power, whereas jurisdiction over corporations must be justified by a deeper sense of
fairness and a more meaningful connection between the defendant and the forum state.”); Twitchell,
supra note 33, at 181 (“[T]he benefits received by a defendant with continuous commercial activities
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With that said, there is nothing conceptually problematic about two
completely independent rules for jurisdiction leading to seemingly
incongruous results.308 In her quote, Justice Sotomayor is referring to
presence-based jurisdiction over individuals, which the Supreme Court
determined in Burnham v. Superior Court to be compatible with due
process.309 There is no equivalent form of jurisdiction over corporations;
that is, one cannot serve a corporate officer or director in a forum and
thereby obtain jurisdiction over the corporation by virtue of service.310
Thus, Justice Sotomayor’s comparison between service on an individual,
on the one hand, and a defendant’s continuous and systematic contacts
with the forum, on the other, is inapposite. Rather, jurisdiction over a
corporation premised on its continuous and systematic general business
contacts that render it “at home” is most closely akin to jurisdiction
based on an individual’s domicile.311 While Justice Sotomayor’s
comments have an intuitive appeal, she is essentially comparing apples
(presence-based jurisdiction for individuals) and oranges (domicile-based
jurisdiction for corporations).
Fifth, Justice Sotomayor implies that the Court’s approach has made
the general jurisdiction inquiry increasingly difficult for courts. She
observes that the new rule requires the defendant to not only possess
continuous and systematic contacts with a state, but also that “those
contacts must . . . surpass some unspecified level when viewed in
comparison to the company’s ‘nationwide and worldwide’ activities.”312
Justice Sotomayor is of the view that this comparative exercise “injects
an additional layer of uncertainty” and that that “courts will now have to
identify the extent of a company’s contacts in every other forum where it
does business in order to compare them against the company’s in-state
contacts.”313 Justice Sotomayor is likely right that the comparative
approach adopted by the Court could marginally complicate the
jurisdictional analysis. However, it is worth noting that the continuous
and systematic test that existed pre-Daimler (with or without the “at
within a state certainly exceed the thin potential benefits received by the hapless traveler who barely
sets foot in the forum’s territory.”).
308. Indeed, the idea that registering to do business (without actually doing business) is a basis for
general jurisdiction while doing business in the Helicopteros sense is not a basis for general jurisdiction is
also seemingly incongruous. See supra Part IV.B. But because the two rely on two different bases for
their legitimacy (consent versus contacts), there is nothing technically incompatible about the two coexisting.
309. See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604.
310. Unless, of course, the corporation is registered to do business in the forum and the forum
regards such registration as consent to general jurisdiction. In this case, however, the basis of
jurisdiction is usually not regarded as presence, but rather consent.
311. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 85–86 (discussing domicile based-jurisdiction, citing Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), and noting that “a similar logic extends to corporations”).
312. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 770 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
313. Id. at 770–71 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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home” qualifier) was hardly a precise science. Lower courts never
exhibited any consistency on what was required to meet the continuous
and systematic threshold. Moreover, the standard has now been set so
high that in most cases, the defendant will fall far short of being “at
home”—making the precise balancing of forum-based versus non-forumbased contacts largely irrelevant.314
***
The Daimler decision will certainly cause upheaval in the case law
for many years to come, as litigants and courts try to come to grips with
its consequences. The biggest implication of Daimler is that doing
business jurisdiction has been wiped off the jurisdictional map. This, in
turn, may result in other grounds for jurisdiction having to “pick up the
slack.” While Daimler is important for what it did say, it is also important
for what it did not say. Below, I explore the critical questions that the
Supreme Court left unanswered in Daimler.

V. Unanswered Questions
Those awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler thought
that it would resolve a very important jurisdictional question: when is
“vicarious jurisdiction” appropriate?315 Unfortunately, the Court did not
answer this question and instead answered another question not argued
before the Court: when is a corporation “at home” for the purposes of
the general jurisdiction inquiry? Even though this latter question was
important, and the Court helpfully clarified the meaning of the “at
home” language it had introduced in Goodyear, it was regrettably silent
on the issue of imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to a parent. It was also
silent on imputing alternative bases of jurisdiction—place of
incorporation or principal place of business—from a subsidiary to a
parent for general jurisdiction purposes.
A. When Should a Subsidiary’s Contacts Be Imputed to the
Parent?
The issue that was surprisingly ducked by both the Court and the
concurrence was the one issue that everyone expected this case to decide:
when can the contacts of a subsidiary be attributed to a parent for
personal jurisdiction purposes? In some ways, the answer to this question
might not matter anymore in many cases. If the parent company is
sufficiently national or global, with contacts dispersed across many
forums, then even with imputation of the subsidiary’s contacts, there still
would not be general jurisdiction over the parent under the Court’s strict

314. See supra note 244.
315. See generally Hoffman, supra note 8 (coining the term “vicarious jurisdiction”).
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“at home” standard. However, one could imagine scenarios involving
less national or less global companies whose connections are spread out
across fewer jurisdictions. In these circumstances, it would be important
to know what test is appropriate to use for imputation of contacts, since
there could still be a plausible argument that even under the new “at
home” standard, the parent is subject to general jurisdiction.
To the Court’s credit, it did reject the Ninth Circuit’s agency test for
imputation of jurisdictional contacts as being one that, in almost all cases,
would yield a pro-jurisdictional result.316 However, it did not clarify if
some other, perhaps stricter, form of agency could justify the imputation
of a subsidiary’s contacts to a parent. If some form of agency theory
could be used to justify the imputation of contacts between the agent and
its principal for general jurisdiction purposes, then this finding would
presumably apply in any agent-principal relationship, not just a
subsidiary-parent relationship.317 After Daimler, it is clear that the Ninth
Circuit’s “sufficiently important” agency test has been rejected—but it is
not clear that all agency tests have been rejected.318 Thus, it is
presumably open to a plaintiff to argue that the contacts of a defendant’s
agent, in certain circumstances, should be imputed to the principal for the
purposes of general jurisdiction.319 What those circumstances are is an open
question.320
The Court should have used Daimler as an opportunity to answer
the question it was actually supposed to answer and that matters greatly
in the real world of litigation: when will the jurisdictional contacts of one

316. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759–60.
317. See Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner, supra note 111, at
21–22 (providing an example of general jurisdiction premised on the hypothetical retention by
Daimler of “ABC, a typical modern law firm” that acts as an agent of Daimler).
318. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759–60. Professor Erichson argues that an agency test is
incompatible with a home state test for general jurisdiction:
One cannot be at home through an agent. One cannot be a citizen through an agent. When
a principal acts through an agent who is a citizen of a state, the principal does not thereby
become a citizen. The principal’s conduct through the agent may subject the principal to
specific jurisdiction for claims arising out of the conduct, but it does not alter the principal’s
home state.
Erichson, supra note 8, at 91–92.
319. See Collyn A. Peddie, Mi Casa Es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 697
(2012); see also Silberman, supra note 8, at 125–26 (noting that “mere agency—or even the more
liberal ‘multinational enterprise’ concept—is much harder to justify [than alter ego] in the context of
general jurisdiction”).
320. On the issue of imputation generally, see Hoffman, supra note 8; Peddie, supra note 319;
Silberman, supra note 8. Interestingly, the Court also referred to the General Distributor Agreement
signed by MBUSA and Daimler in assessing the agency question. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752. This
leaves open the possibility that a determination of agency will turn, at least in part, in how the parties
structure their relationship in writing.
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party count against another party?321 Or, more precisely, when will the
jurisdictional contacts of a subsidiary count against its parent?322 Courts
have been divided on the issue of the attribution of jurisdictional
contacts from a subsidiary to a parent for many years,323 and the
Supreme Court in Daimler missed the perfect opportunity to provide
some clarity and guidance to courts.
B. What If the Basis of Jurisdiction Is Place of Incorporation or
Principal Place of Business?
Both the Court and the concurrence in Daimler focused exclusively
on the imputation of contacts from a subsidiary to a parent company for
purposes of assessing whether the parent is subject to general jurisdiction
in the forum. What if the underlying basis of jurisdiction over the
subsidiary, however, is not continuous and systematic general business
contacts sufficient to render the corporation “at home,” but rather state
of incorporation or principal place of business? For instance, in Daimler
itself, what if MBUSA was incorporated in California or had its principal
place of business there? If this underlying basis of general jurisdiction
over MBUSA could—under whatever theory—be imputed to the parent,
what does that mean for general jurisdiction over the parent?324
There are at least three possible analyses here. First, if jurisdiction
over the subsidiary is based on being incorporated in the forum or having
its principal place of business there, and that jurisdictional contact is
imputed to the parent, one could argue that the parent is de facto subject
to general jurisdiction in the forum as well. Using a variation of the facts

321. Contra Sherry, supra note 8, at 116 (“The imputation question must be answered eventually,
but it should be addressed in a more appropriate case: one in which the plaintiffs have a real
connection to the forum state and the parent company can plausibly be held liable for the acts of its
subsidiary. That is not this case. Deciding a broad, recurring question in the context of a unique case is
too likely to lead to an answer that is right for this case but wrong for the run-of-the mill case.”).
322. Professor Winship observes that the question is actually more complicated than it appears
given different forms of corporate structure. Winship, supra note 8, at 441. She states, “[g]enerally
courts have not wrestled with the consequences of the specific corporate relationship—whether the
subsidiary is direct or indirect, how many tiers are between the parent and subsidiary, or whether the
subsidiary is wholly or partially owned.” Id.
323. See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 766 (“Despite the frequency with which courts must deal with
these jurisdictional arguments, the lower court case law is a mess.”).
324. Professor Childress also identifies this as an unanswered question in the wake of Daimler:
This raises an interesting question: would Daimler be subject to general jurisdiction in
Delaware or New Jersey, where MBUSA would be subject to general jurisdiction, as these
are its places of incorporation and principal place of business? Given that under the Court’s
test MBUSA is at home in these fora, can its contacts be imputed to Daimler? We do not
know the answer to that question in light of the Court’s silence on imputation. But, I suspect
that the answer would be no in light of the Court’s strong language limiting general
jurisdiction.
Childress, After Bauman, supra note 8, at 201.
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of Daimler itself, one could argue that if MBUSA was incorporated in
California and that jurisdictional contact was imputed to Daimler, then
Daimler would also be regarded as being incorporated in California and
therefore subject to general jurisdiction there. Depending on how
expansive the underlying test for imputation is, this approach could have
quite significant jurisdictional consequences. If courts adopted a liberal
view of imputation, then a parent could be subject to general jurisdiction
in any state where any of its subsidiaries are incorporated or have their
principal place of business. This would give a lot of power to a state like
Delaware, where the majority of corporations in America are
incorporated.325 Thus, Delaware would not only have general jurisdiction
over the companies that have incorporated in Delaware, but also
potentially the parents of those companies, provided that a court would
impute this jurisdictional contact to the parent.
This approach was recently taken by the U.S. District Court of
Minnesota in George v. Uponor Corp.326 In George, the parent company
was incorporated in Finland, while its subsidiary was incorporated in
Illinois and had its principal place of business in Minnesota.327 The court,
applying a form of agency test, held that jurisdiction was appropriate
because the parent “exercises a sufficient degree of control and
domination over [the subsidiary] to satisfy due process.”328
Consequently, because the subsidiary was subject to general jurisdiction
in Minnesota (its principal place of business), so too was the parent.329
George was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler.
After Daimler was released, the defendant moved for reconsideration.330
The court upheld its earlier decision that the parent was subject to
general jurisdiction in Minnesota.331 In so doing, it distinguished
Daimler, stating:
In contrast, Uponor Corp.’s subsidiary in this case, Uponor, Inc., does
not simply conduct business in Minnesota. Unlike MBUSA, Uponor,
Inc.’s principal place of business is in the forum state, and Uponor
Corp. conducts much if not most of its American operations, in
addition to sales, through Uponor, Inc. Finding personal jurisdiction
over Uponor Corp. in Minnesota on this basis does not broadly expose
the parent company to jurisdiction in any state where it conducts
business.332

325. See generally Lewis S. Black, Jr., Del. Dep’t of State Div. of Corps., Why Corporations
Choose Delaware (2007).
326. 988 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Minn. 2013).
327. Id. at 1060.
328. Id. at 1066.
329. Id. at 1066–67.
330. Id. at 1078.
331. Id. at 1078–79.
332. Id. at 1079.
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It is clear that the George court viewed the imputation question
presented in Daimler (imputation of contacts) as different from that
presented in in the case before it (imputation of principal place of
business). In the latter scenario, it viewed general jurisdiction as
following automatically from the imputation of the subsidiary’s principal
place of business to the parent.
There is arguably a conceptual problem with subjecting a parent to
general jurisdiction in a state because its subsidiary is incorporated there
or has its principal place of business there. It essentially results in a
corporation being incorporated or having its principal place of business
in two places. In our hypothetical variation of Daimler, Daimler would
be regarded as incorporated or having its principal place of business in
both California and Germany. This would not square well with the
Court’s statement that “[t]hose affiliations [principal place of business
and place of incorporation] have the virtue of being unique—that is, each
ordinarily indicates only one place.”333
A second approach would be to impute the underlying basis of
jurisdiction, whether incorporation or place of business, and view that
basis, alongside all the other contacts between the parent and the forum,
as either supporting or not supporting the exercise of general jurisdiction
over the parent. In other words, the underlying basis of jurisdiction over
the subsidiary would be viewed as just another contact for the court to
consider when assessing whether the parent was subject to general
jurisdiction in the forum. In our hypothetical variation of Daimler, the
forum would consider whether all of the contacts between Daimler and
California, including the imputed jurisdictional contact (subsidiary
incorporated in California), would render Daimler subject to general
jurisdiction in California. This approach would essentially involve a
holistic weighing of the parent’s independent jurisdictional contacts with
the forum and adding to those contacts the fact that its subsidiary is
incorporated in the forum or has its principal place of business there.
This approach, however, is both difficult to conceptualize and to apply. It
is not clear that “place of incorporation of a subsidiary,” for instance, is a
jurisdictional contact in the same way that more traditional contacts are,
such as physical places of business in the state, employees in the state,
purchases in the states, sales to the state, etc. Even if it were a legitimate
jurisdictional contact, how does the fact that a corporation’s subsidiary is
incorporated in the state play out in analyzing continuous and systematic
business contacts, such that the corporation is fairly regarded to be “at
home”? That is, it is unclear how to weigh this jurisdictional contact (if it
is one) alongside all others in applying the new “at home” test.
Moreover, even if this factor could be weighed as part of an overall
333. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
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assessment of contacts, one is left with the same issue presented in
Daimler: if place of incorporation of a subsidiary is just another contact,
this will not mean much if the parent is a large multinational corporation.
In other words, the impact of this contact will be watered down in cases
where the parent is a large corporation such as Daimler. Further, one
might argue that this approach defeats the “imputation” aspect of
whatever jurisdictional attribution theory a court were to use (e.g.
agency, alter ego, etc.). Imputation connotes something more than
simply looking at the place of a subsidiary’s incorporation as a factor in
assessing general jurisdiction over a parent.
A third approach is to say that while one can impute contacts, one
cannot impute the other two bases of general jurisdiction. Under this
approach, the argument is that it makes sense to impute the contacts of a
subsidiary, such as sales, revenues, and employees, because the
subsidiary is under the umbrella of the parent (albeit the two entities are
separately incorporated). However, it does not make sense to impute a
jurisdictional status that a corporation can have with only one territorial
entity. So while factual “contacts” may carry over and have independent
jurisdictional consequences for the parent, a descriptive status, such as
place of incorporation or principal place of business, cannot. This
approach has the benefit of being the cleanest of the three and avoids
most conceptual snags and practical difficulties in application. However,
one could argue that of the three possible bases for general jurisdiction
over a corporation, state of incorporation and principal place of business
are the “paradigm” cases for general jurisdiction, and therefore should
carry some jurisdictional consequence for the parent. Otherwise stated,
the “at home” basis for general jurisdiction is the most tenuous basis of
the three—and should be the least likely to have jurisdictional
ramifications for a parent.
***
The Supreme Court in Daimler left two very important
jurisdictional questions for another day: (1) when should a subsidiary’s
contacts be imputed to its parent? and (2) how does imputation work if
the underlying basis of jurisdiction over the subsidiary is that it is
incorporated in the forum or has its principal place of business there?
The Court’s silence in this respect is unfortunate since many cases
involving general jurisdiction implicate some form of agency
relationship. For instance, in both the Bumbo and Barriere cases
discussed above, jurisdiction over the defendant was premised, at least in
part, on its relationship with an agent in the forum. Nonetheless, the
Court’s reinforcement of the “at home” test may make the imputation
question less pressing than it once was. Since many parents are large
multinational corporations with contacts dispersed throughout the
country or the world, it is unlikely that they would be considered “at
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home” even with the imputation of contacts. The analysis is, of course,
slightly different if the underlying basis of jurisdiction is that the
subsidiary is incorporated in the forum or has its principal place of
business there. Here, it is an open question as to what courts will do.

Conclusion
This Article asks in its title, “Where is Home Depot ‘at Home’?” Up
until very recently, the answer was not entirely clear. In particular, it was
not clear whether Home Depot was “at home” in every state where it
conducts a significant amount of businesswhich presumably is in each
and every state. Today, there should be more clarity on the issue. Home
Depot is “at home” in its state of incorporation (Delaware) and its
principal place of business (Georgia). Beyond that, it is unlikely that any
court following the letter and spirit of Daimler will find that there is
general jurisdiction elsewhere.
The decision in Daimler effects a dramatic change to the law of
personal jurisdiction in the United States. It marks the end of doing
business jurisdiction, a basis for personal jurisdiction that has prevailed
in the case law for over a century.334 No longer will a court be able to
exercise dispute-blind jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis that it
has continuous and systematic contacts with the forum. Defendants will
applaud the case; plaintiffs will try to find ways around it. How Daimler
plays out in the long run, however, ultimately remains to be seen.

334. Twitchell, supra note 33, at 203 (noting that “we have used [doing business jurisdiction]
regularly for more than a century”).
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